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Sex Offenses Under Military Law: 
Will the Recent Changes in the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice Re-traumatize Sexual Assault 
Survivors in the Courtroom? 
 
 
Lisa M. Schenck 
 
President Barack Obama said Tuesday that he has “no tolerance” for 
sexual assault in the military, comments made in the wake of a new 
Pentagon report showing the instances of such crimes have spiked since 
2010 . . . . “I expect consequences,” Obama added.  “So I don’t just 
want more speeches or awareness programs or training, but ultimately 
folks look the other way.  If we find out somebody’s engaging in this, 
they’ve got to be held accountable—prosecuted, stripped of their 
positions, court[-]martialed, fired, dishonorably discharged.  Period.”1 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
The Commander-in-Chief, President Barack Obama, as quoted above, 
recently turned his attention to sexual assault in the military services.  The 
President is not alone in his concern.  Congress, the media, and the American 
public have focused similar attention on this hot topic over the past twenty years.  
Congress and the media have criticized, analyzed, and pushed the Department of 
Defense [DoD],
2
 to review and revamp its sexual assault prevention, training, and 
                                                                                                                            
   Associate Dean for Academic Affairs, Professorial Lecturer in Law,  Senior Adviser to the 
National Security Law LL.M. Program, The George Washington University Law School.  The author 
is a retired U.S. Army Judge Advocate General’s Corps colonel who served as an Associate and 
Senior Judge on the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals (2002–08); upon retirement, she served as 
the Senior Adviser to the Defense Task Force on Sexual Assault in the Military Services (2008-09).  
B.A., Providence College; M.P.A., Fairleigh Dickinson University; J.D., Notre Dame Law School; 
LL.M., The Judge Advocate General’s Legal Center and School; LL.M., Yale Law School; J.S.D., 
Yale Law School.  This article reflects the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the 
views of the University, Law School, Department of Defense, or Department of the Army.  The 
author would like to thank Julie Dickerson and Michelle Ross, two dedicated research assistants, for 
their assistance and support.  Copyright © 2014 by Lisa M. Schenck.   
1   Michael O’Brien, Obama: ‘No Tolerance’ for Military Sexual Assault, NBC NEWS (May 7, 
2013), http://nbcpolitics.nbcnews.com/_news/2013/05/07/18107743-obama-no-tolerance-for-
military-sexual-assault?lite.  
2   In this article, the terms “military,” “military services,” and “Armed Forces” will be used 
interchangeably. Although Congress emphasizes the importance of the DoD’s sexual assault 
prevention and response policies, the DoD is a civilian organization that oversees the military 
services.  The DoD 
 Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=2446199 
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response programs, as well as its accountability, methods of reporting, 
investigating, and disposing of sexual assault cases.  Part of the Congressional 
“push” included requesting that the DoD propose revisions to the existing punitive 
articles addressing sexual assault in the Uniform Code of Military Justice [UCMJ].  
Congress passed sweeping legislative changes to military law effective in 2007 and 
made modest changes effective in 2012.  As a result, the military services have 
been trying sexual assault cases using a completely revised punitive article, 
grouping sexual assault offenses under Article 120 of the UCMJ.    
Although described as being more protective of victims and covering the vast 
array of sexual assault offenses, this Article argues that the recent changes in 
substantive military law regarding sexual assault in 2007 and 2012 are not 
sufficient to fully protect victims and may not result in the convictions that the 
President, Congress, the media, and the public are so anxious to see in military 
sexual assault cases.  While perpetrators may be tried by courts-martial, they may 
not be “stripped of their positions, court[-]martialed, fired, [or] dishonorably 
discharged”3 as President Obama hopes; rather, they may be acquitted.  
This Article evaluates substantive military criminal law, UCMJ art. 120 
[Article 120], and Military Rules of Evidence [Mil. R. Evid.] 404(a) and 405(c).  
Drawing on lessons learned from state and federal
4
 laws, the Article then makes 
recommendations regarding statutory changes in military criminal sexual assault 
and procedural statutes.  Specifically, the author recommends amending 
substantive military criminal law to add the offense of “Indecent Act” back into 
Article 120; modifying the definition of force; eliminating the increased emphasis 
on whether the victim’s fears are “reasonable”; removing the focus from the 
accused’s perceptions of the victim; returning the statutory limitations on the 
affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent; adopting California’s 
evidentiary threshold for giving affirmative defense instructions on mistake of fact 
as to consent and consent; and creating a statutory structure to restrict judicial 
appellate discretion in determining the need for some lesser-included offense 
instructions. 
                                                                                                                            
is responsible for providing the military forces needed to deter war and protect the security of 
the United States (U.S.).  The major elements of these forces are the Army, Navy, Air Force, 
and Marine Corps.  The President is the Commander-in-Chief, while the Secretary of Defense 
exercises authority, direction, and control over the Department.  This includes the Office of the 
Secretary of Defense, Organization of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the three 
Military Departments, the Combatant Commands, the Office of the Inspector General, 
seventeen Defense Agencies, ten DoD Field Activities, and other organizations, such as the 
National Guard Bureau (NGB) and the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization 
(JIEDDO). 
Organizations and Functions of the Department of Defense, OFFICE OF THE SEC’Y OF DEF., OFFICE 
OF THE DIR. OF ADMIN. AND MGMT. 
http://odam.defense.gov/omp/Functions/Organizational_Portfolios/Organization_and_Functions_Gui
debook.html (last visited Mar. 17, 2013).  
3   O’Brien, supra note 1.   
4   As used in this article, the term “federal” does not include the military or Armed Forces.  
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The author also notes that some military justice system critics attribute 
unwarranted acquittals in sexual assault cases to the courts-martial practice of 
allowing evidence of the accused’s good military character.  Admitting such 
evidence regarding the accused’s good military character may shift the trial focus 
from the misconduct at issue to the accused’s stellar military service record.  In 
many cases, the chain of command may testify on the accused’s behalf, and a 
process known as “reverse command influence,” a type of jury nullification, may 
result in the accused’s acquittal, even in cases where evidence of the accused’s 
guilt is overwhelming.  The author supports a statute-based amendment of Mil. R. 
Evid. 404(a) and 405(c) to clarify that general military character or good soldier 
evidence is not admissible to show probability of innocence for sexual assault 
offenses.
5
  
  
II. BACKGROUND: WHY THE CRY FOR CHANGE? 
 
Substantive military criminal law is set forth in the UCMJ punitive articles.
6
  
Since Congress passed the UCMJ in 1950, two enumerated articles covered the 
                                                                                                                            
5   Another approach to restrict good military character evidence is illustrated by Senate Bill 
1917, the Victims Protection Act which passed in the 113th Congress 2d. Session, on Mar. 6, 2014 by 
a vote of 97-0.  Section 3(g) provides: 
 
(g) MODIFICATION OF MILITARY RULES OF EVIDENCE RELATING TO ADMISSIBILITY OF 
GENERAL MILITARY CHARACTER TOWARD PROBABILITY OF INNOCENCE.—Not later than 
180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, Rule 404(a) of the Military Rules of 
Evidence shall be modified to clarify that the general military character of an accused is 
not admissible for the purpose of showing the probability of innocence of the accused, 
except that evidence of a trait of the military character of an accused may be offered in 
evidence by the accused when that trait is relevant to an element of an offense for which 
the accused has been charged. 
 
The difficulty with this approach is if the President defines the term “good military character” 
too broadly, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces in all likelihood will overturn some sexual 
assault convictions as well as other convictions because that court gives limited deference to the 
President’s interpretations of statutes.  See infra note 30.  The Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces 
has long held that good military character is relevant for all offenses. If the President defines “good 
military character” too narrowly, then the rights of victims will be unfairly harmed.  See infra notes 
136–54 and accompanying text.   
6   See 10 U.S.C. §§ 877–934 (2006).  The UCMJ punitive articles are listed in Appendix 2 of 
the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2012) [hereinafter 2012 MCM].  The President, 
through executive orders providing elements and some definitions for offenses, and various service 
regulations are important sources of substantive military criminal law.  See 2012 MCM (2011); U.S. 
DEP’T OF ARMY, REG. 27–10 (2011) [hereinafter AR 27–10].  On June 30, 1775, the Second 
Continental Congress established sixty-nine Articles of War to govern the conduct of the Continental 
Army.  William Winthrop, MILITARY LAW AND PRECEDENTS, 21 (1920).  Upon the ratification of the 
United States Constitution in 1789, Article I, Section 8 endowed Congress with the power to regulate 
the land and naval forces.  Using its newly endowed powers, on April 10, 1806, Congress enacted 
101 Articles of War, superseding the Revolutionary War articles, under which the Army operated for 
decades.  Id. at 23.  Discipline in the Navy was governed by the Articles for the Government of the 
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most serious sexual assault offenses, “Rape and Carnal Knowledge” (Article 120), 
and “Sodomy” (Article 125), and the general article covered a broad category of 
sex offenses under the categories of “Indecent Assault,” “Indecent Acts or 
Liberties with a Child,” “Indecent Exposure,” and “Indecent Acts with Another” 
(Article 134).   
Prior to the statutory changes implemented in the past ten years, the offense of 
rape under Article 120 reflected the common law and was defined as, “[a]ny 
person subject to this chapter who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force 
and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be punished by death or such other 
punishment as a court-martial may direct.”7  This definition of rape became widely 
criticized as antiquated; because “force” lacks “obvious or plain” meaning, the 
statutory scheme focused attention on the victim’s conduct as opposed to the 
accused’s conduct, and culpability-based gradations of conduct and punishment are 
more effective in deterring crime.
8
  “The requirement that a woman resist her 
assailant grew out of the law’s suspicion of the credibility of unchaste or vengeful 
women.”9  As views of women’s place in society changed, however, the law 
eventually followed.
10
  
In 2005, the Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces [CAAF] identified the 
problems associated with Article 120’s dated rape definition: 
                                                                                                                            
United States Navy. DEP’T OF THE NAVY—NAVAL HISTORICAL CENTER, available at 
http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq59-7.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).  Congress passed the 
UCMJ on May 5, 1950, which placed the military and naval services under the same disciplinary 
statutes, and President Harry S. Truman signed it into law.  On May 31, 1951, the UCMJ went into 
effect.  UNIFORM CODE OF MILITARY JUSTICE, http://www.ucmj.us/history-of-the-ucm (last visited 
May 17, 2014). 
7   The 1950 version of UCMJ, art. 120, 10 U.S.C. 920, was enacted on May 5, 1950, (May 5, 
1950, ch. 169, Sec. 1, 64 Stat. 140) and remained in effect without substantial changes until the 
statute was amended on January 6, 2006 by the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 
2006, Pub. L. No. 109-163, §§ 551–53, 119 Stat. 3136, 3256–64 (2006) (codified as amended at 10 
U.S.C. § 920 (2006)).  The January 6, 2006 amendment became effective on October 1, 2007.  See 
P.L. 109-163, Div A, Title V, Subtitle E, § 552(a)(1), 119 Stat. 3257, as provided by § 552(f) of such 
Act.  The version of Article 120 in effect prior to October 1, 2007 will be referred to hereinafter as 
“2006 Article 120” and the version effective on October 1, 2007 will be referred to hereinafter as 
“2007 Article 120.” 
8   Major Timothy W. Murphy, USAF, A Matter of Force: The Redefinition of Rape, 39 
A.F.L. REV. 19, 19–23 (1996).  A brief description of courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses such as 
rape, and the changing jurisprudence of rape prosecutions in the military over the last hundred years 
is provided in Mark Harvey, SEX CRIMES AND THE UCMJ: A REPORT FOR THE JOINT SERVICE 
COMMITTEE ON MILITARY JUSTICE (Feb. 2005), available at 
www.dod.mil/dodgc/php/docssubcommittee_reportmarkharvey1-13-05.doc [hereinafter 2005 SEX 
CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC]; see also DEP’T OF DEF. OFFICE OF THE GEN. COUNCIL, Comparison of 
Title 18 Sexual Offenses and UCMJ Sexual Offenses (May 2005). 
9   Susan Schwartz, An Argument for the Elimination of the Resistance Requirement from the 
Definition of Forcible Rape, 16 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 567, 569 (1983) (internal citations omitted).  
10  Id. at 570. 
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 [Article 120 did] not reflect the more recent trend for rape statutes to 
recognize gradations in the offense based on context.  These statutes 
incorporate the legal realization that the force used may vary depending 
on the relationship and familiarity, if any, between perpetrator and 
victim, but the essence of the offense remains the same—sexual 
intercourse against the will of the victim.  Because Article 120 is dated, 
its elements may not easily fit the range of circumstances now generally 
recognized as “rape,” including date rape, acquaintance rape, statutory 
rape, as well as stranger-on-stranger rape.  As a result, the traditional 
military rape elements have been applied in contexts for which the 
elements were not initially contemplated.  Case law has evolved to 
address this reality.
11
 
 
III. WILL THE REVISED ARTICLE 120 RESULT IN MORE SEXUAL ASSAULT 
CONVICTIONS?:  STATUTORY ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDED CHANGES TO THE 
UCMJ 
 
Without recommending specific statutory changes, DoD reports published 
over the past decade have included some review
12
 of the sex offenses available 
under military law for which military offenders may be tried for sexual assaults.
13
  
Congress, in the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal 
Year 2005, required the Secretary of Defense to propose changes to the existing 
sex offenses in the UCMJ, “to conform . . . more closely to other [f]ederal laws and 
regulations that address [sexual assault],”14 but existing federal statutes15 were 
                                                                                                                            
11  United States v. Leak, 61 M.J. 234, 246 (C.A.A.F. 2005) (internal citations omitted) (citing 
United States v. Simpson, 58 M.J. 368, 377 (C.A.A.F. 2003) (drill instructor’s coercive influence 
over recruits); United States v. Palmer, 33 M.J. 7, 9 (C.M.A. 1991) (parental compulsion found to be 
a form of constructive force); United States v. Henderson, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 268, 273, 15 C.M.R. 268, 
273 (1954) (concept of constructive force recognized as applicable to military)).  
12  DEP’T OF DEF., ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 27 (2011) [hereinafter 
2010 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT] (citing previous year’s report and DTFSAMS REPORT 2009, 
infra note 117) stated:  
[P]ractitioners consistently advised [Defense] Task Force [on Sexual Assault in the 
Military (DTFSAMS)] members that the new Article 120 (effective October 1, 2007) is 
cumbersome and confusing.  Prosecutors expressed concern that Article 120 may cause 
unwarranted acquittals.  In addition, significant issues related to the constitutionality of 
Article 120’s statutory affirmative defense of and consent to lesser-included offenses 
have evolved.  
13  Military offenders may also be tried by non-military federal and state civilian authorities 
pursuant to federal and state criminal law.    
14  Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005, Pub. L. No. 
108–375, 118 Stat. 1811, 1920 (2004).  In 2005, the Defense Task Force on Sexual Harassment & 
Violence at the Military Service Academies further highlighted the problems with the existing UCMJ 
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primarily used to prosecute cases on Indian reservations and were seldom applied, 
and therefore, rarely reviewed on appeal.
16
  In response to Congress’ request, a 
                                                                                                                            
sex offenses, finding that “a key obstacle to increasing accountability for rape and sexual assault is 
that current statutes, though flexible, do not reflect the full spectrum of criminal sexual behaviors 
encountered at the military service academies and society at large,” and recommended “Congress 
revise the current sexual misconduct statutes to more clearly and comprehensively address the full 
range of sexual misconduct.”  REP. OF THE DEF. TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT AND VIOLENCE 
AT THE MILITARY SERVICE ACADEMIES ES–2 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 DTF ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT 
& VIOLENCE REPORT].  
15  On December 31, 2011, P.L. 112-81, Div A, Title V, Subtitle D, § 541(a), 125 Stat. 1404, 
the current version of UCMJ, art. 120, 10 U.S.C. 920 was signed into law and became effective 180 
days after enactment (for offenses committed on or after June 28, 2012) as provided by § 541(f) of 
the Act, which appears as 10 USCS § 843 note.  The version of Article 120 becoming effective on 
June 28, 2012, will be referred to hereinafter as “2012 Article 120.”  The 2012 Article 120 is similar 
to Title 18, but the latter does not have definitions and the offenses include the term “knowingly.”  
The term “knowingly” is used in many Title 18 offenses to indicate the requisite acts were not done 
inadvertently or by accident.  For the sex offenses in 18 U.S.C. §§ 224144 (2006), the government 
need not prove the touching of the victim was for sexual gratification.  Under military law, mistake is 
an affirmative defense.  Most Title 18 offenses include the word “knowingly” and most military 
offenses do not.  The concept of “knowingly” is automatically incorporated into UCMJ offenses.  
See, e.g., 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 1.b(2)(a).  The definitions in 2012 Article 120 and 18 
U.S.C. § 2246 (2006) of “sexual act” require a sexual penetration of the body of the victim versus 
“sexual contact,” which only requires a sexual touching of the body of the victim.  Penetration of the 
victim’s body makes the offense more aggravated.  Using the definitions of sexual act and sexual 
contact is a very efficient way to list offenses.  The definitions are somewhat involved and taking 
them out of the offense and putting them into a definition section makes it easier for the practitioner 
to recognize what is different between the two offenses.  Of course, some might describe this as 
“cumbersome” because they are not trained in how to apply non-UCMJ statutes.  GOV’T 
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), REPORT TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON MILITARY PERSONNEL, 
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, MILITARY JUSTICE:  OVERSIGHT AND 
BETTER COLLABORATION NEEDED FOR SEXUAL ASSAULT INVESTIGATIONS AND ADJUDICATIONS 22 
(Jun. 2011).  
16  In FY 2009, the nation’s tribes Uniform Crime Report indicated 882 forcible rapes, and in 
FY 2010, they reported 852 rapes.  STEVEN W. PERRY, TRIBAL CRIME DATA COLLECTION ACTIVITIES 
9 (Dep’t of Justice, Oct. 2012), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/tcdca12.pdf.  Convictions 
for sexual abuse of adults from 2007 to 2012 varied from eighty-seven to 137 per year in U.S. 
District Courts.  Lisa M. Schenck, Informing the Debate About Sexual Assault in the Military 
Services: Is the Department of Defense Its Own Worst Enemy?, 11 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 579, 627 
n.214 (2014) and accompanying chart (citations omitted).  In 2009 and 2011, ninety-seven percent of 
trials in U.S. District Court were guilty pleas.  Michael Nasser Petegorsky, Plea Bargaining in the 
Dark: The Duty to Disclose Exculpatory Brady Evidence During Plea Bargaining, 81 FORDHAM L. 
REV. 3599; 3602–11 (2013). Of the sexual abuse cases where the defendants pled not guilty and were 
convicted, a fraction resulted in jury trials which involved instructions on offenses, evidence, 
burdens, and lesser-included offenses. Consequently, few sexual abuse cases ever undergo appellate 
review or are reversed for legal errors concerning instructions.  From 2007 to 2011, the most recent 
years of statistics available, there were only 154 convictions of sexual abuse offenses after contested 
trials under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2241–44, 2250. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS DATABASE, 
http://www.bjs.gov/fjsrc/tsec.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2014).  An individual may be convicted of 
more than one Title 18 offense at a single trial.  From 2006 to 2010, eighty-six sexual abuse offenses 
were reversed or remanded on appeal, and thirty-three cases were partially affirmed on appeal.  Id.  
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subcommittee of the Joint Service Committee [JSC] provided an 826-page report 
focused on statutory changes to assist Congress in bringing the UCMJ up to date 
with the latest state and federal sex offense statutes.
17
  The Subcommittee 
members, however, concluded that change was unnecessary, stating:  
 
[We] were unable to identify any sexual conduct (that the military has an 
interest in prosecuting) that [could not] be prosecuted under the current 
UCMJ and [Manual for Courts-Martial]
18
 . . . [and] unanimously 
concluded that change [was] not required.  [And a] majority of the 
subcommittee believed that the rationale for significant change was 
outweighed by the confusion and disruption that such change would 
cause.
19
  
 
Despite the Subcommittee’s assertion that change was not required, “the 
[S]ubcommittee . . . concluded that if Congress direct[ed] a UCMJ change to 
substantially conform to Title 18, Option 5 [was] the alternative that best [took] 
into account unique military requirements.”20  In 2006, Congress implemented 
Option 5 and created a “new” Article 120 (effective October 2007),21 which 
outlined sexual assault offenses.  In 2011, Congress created additional changes to 
Article 120 (effective June 2012)
22
 and revamped available defenses.  This Article 
contends that some of these changes are beneficial, but further modifications 
should be made. 
 
A. Article 120 Changes Effective October 1, 2007 [2007 Article 120]   
 
In the past ten years, Congress has changed statutory sex offenses and 
applicable burdens of proof twice.
23
  In 2006, Congress created a “new” Article 
120 modeled after the Title 18 sexual assault offenses.  The 2006 changes are the 
                                                                                                                            
Many of those cases likely involved litigation over application of sentencing guidelines rather than 
instructions on elements of offenses, lesser-included offenses, burdens, and defenses.   
17  See 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8.  
18  MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2005) [hereinafter 2005 MCM].  
19  2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8, at 1.  
20  Id.  
21  See 2007 Article 120, supra note 7.  
22  2012 MCM, supra note 6, Appendix 28, at ¶ 45.  
23  The 2012 MCM, supra note 6, contains the punitive articles, elements of offenses, and 
some definitions applicable to sex offenses committed before October 1, 2007 at Appendix 27; 
committed between October 1, 2007 through June 27, 2012 at Appendix 28; and committed after 
June 27, 2012 at pt. IV, ¶ 45.   
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most significant statutory changes to military substantive criminal offenses since 
enactment of the 1950 version of the UCMJ.  Specifically, the new Article 120 set 
forth a gradation of sex offenses based on aggravating factors, establishing the 
following categories:  
 
(a) rape; (b) rape of a child; (c) aggravated sexual assault; (d) aggravated 
sexual assault of a child; (e) aggravated sexual contact; (f) aggravated 
sexual abuse of a child; (g) aggravated sexual contact with a child; (h) 
abusive sexual contact; (i) abusive sexual contact with a child; (j) 
indecent liberty with a child; (k) indecent act; (l) forcible pandering; (m) 
wrongful sexual contact; and (n) indecent exposure.
24
   
 
The changes in 2006 also included definitions of numerous terms
25
 and 
limitations on the two most common affirmative defenses—consent and mistake of 
fact as to consent—which were not specifically included in the previous UCMJ sex 
offenses and were not included in Title 18.  These definitions served to fill a 
widening gap, created due to appellate decisions, which continuously modified the 
scope of offenses and changed instructions trial judges were required to provide to 
court members (i.e., the jury).  In the past, military courts relied on case-law-based 
definitions, which trial judges used to instruct the court members regarding the 
offenses.  This became problematic with appellate courts occasionally deciding to 
change a definition or, in some cases, condemning the instruction a trial judge had 
used without providing a model definition or instruction.
26
  A vicious cycle 
developed with trial judges crafting instructions and appellate courts reversing 
cases.  By providing statutory definitions in the 2006 provisions, trial judges were 
able to simply read the definitions to the court members, vastly simplifying the 
trial process and providing transparency to the UCMJ, as the definitions of 
offenses were no longer buried in case law. 
Furthermore, the new Article 120 effective in 2007:  (1) moved the following 
Article 134
27
 sex offenses (“Indecent Assault,” “Indecent Acts or Liberties with a 
                                                                                                                            
24  2007 Article 120, supra note 7; see also Lieutenant Colonel Mark L. Johnson, Forks in the 
Road: Recent Developments in Substantive Criminal Law, 2006 ARMY LAW. 23, 27 (Jun. 2006).  
25  Definitions in the 2007 Article 120 include: (1) sexual act; (2) sexual contact; (3) grievous 
bodily harm; (4) dangerous weapon or object; (5) force; (6) threatening or placing another in fear 
under (a) rape or (e) aggravated sexual contact; (7) threatening or placing another in fear under (c) 
aggravated sexual assault or (h) abusive sexual contact; (8) bodily harm; (9) child; (10) lewd act; (11) 
indecent liberty; and (12) indecent conduct.  
26  A brief description of courts-martial jurisdiction over offenses such as rape, and the 
changing jurisprudence of rape prosecutions in the military over the last hundred years is provided in 
2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8. 
27  UCMJ, art. 134 [hereinafter Article 134]; 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶¶ 61113. 
Article 134 prohibits “all disorders and neglects to the prejudice of good order and discipline in the 
armed forces, all conduct of a nature to bring discredit upon the armed forces, and crimes and 
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Child,” “Indecent Exposure,” and “Indecent Acts with Another”) to Article 120; 
(2) amended Article 134’s “Indecent Language” communicated to another;28 and 
(3) added “compelled” pandering (coercing a person to commit prostitution) as an 
offense.
29
  These offenses were crimes in the majority of state jurisdictions.  
Transferring these Article 134 offenses to Article 120 was beneficial for two 
reasons: (1) the requirement to prove that the offense was prejudicial to good order 
and discipline or service discrediting conduct as an element of the offense no 
longer existed, and (2) Article 120 was an offense that the legislative branch 
created with statutory elements and definitions, rather than an Article 134 offense 
promulgated by a Presidential Executive Order.
30
  
Essentially, the JSC Subcommittee concluded that these Article 120 revisions 
provided the following advantages: 
  
1.  All citizens, military or civilian, [would] face similar prohibitions. 
2.  [S]ex[ ] crimes [would be divided] into degrees based on culpability 
of defendant. 
3. [M]ore specific notice of prohibited conduct [would be provided] 
because offenses are more detailed (compare Article 120, UCMJ with 18 
U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B)).
31
  
                                                                                                                            
offenses not capital,” which includes application of the Federal Assimilative Crimes Act, 18 U.S.C. § 
13 (2006).  2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 60a.  
28  This offense remains an Article 134 offense, but “the communication of indecent language . 
. . in the physical presence of a child” is now prohibited under Article 120.  See 2012 MCM, supra 
note 6, at ¶ 89c. 
29  2006 Article 120, supra note 7; Defense Sexual Trauma Response Oversight and Good 
Governance Act, S. 1018, 112th Cong. (2011).  Pandering remained an Article 134 offense.  Article 
134; 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 97.  
30  The enumerated punitive articles in the UCMJ receive greater deference from the CAAF 
than offenses generated by the President and the Executive Branch.  “It is well established that when 
the statute’s language is plain, the sole function of the courts—at least where the disposition required 
by the text is not absurd—is to enforce it according to its terms.”  Lamie v. United States Trustee, 
540 U.S. 526, 534 (2004) (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).  CAAF accords 
minimal deference to the President’s generation of offenses.  Ellis v. Jacob, 26 M.J. 90, 92 (C.M.A. 
1988) (“President’s rulemaking authority does not extend to substantive military criminal law.”).  See 
also United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 88 (C.A.A.F. 2007) (holding the President’s description of 
the affirmative defense of self defense in the MCM was incomplete).  
31  The pre-2007 version of Article 120(a) defined rape as: “Any person subject to this chapter 
who commits an act of sexual intercourse by force and without consent, is guilty of rape and shall be 
punished by death or such other punishment as a court-martial may direct.”  2006 Article 120, supra 
note 7.  Sexual abuse is prohibited by 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) (2006), which provides:  
Whoever [jurisdictional statement] . . . knowingly— . . . (2) engages in a sexual act with 
another person if that other person is— . . . (B) physically incapable of declining 
participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that sexual act; or 
attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for any term of years or 
for life.  
448 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol 11:2 
 
 
 
4.  [The g]overnment’s requirement to prove lack of consent as an 
element [would be eliminated] –reduc[ing] an implied element that [the] 
victim must resist.  
5.  [M]ost serious sex[] offenses [would be consolidated] under one 
UCMJ article.
32
  
  
B. Article 120 Changes Effective June 28, 2012 [2012 Article 120]—Article 120 
Today: Analysis, Problems, and Recommendations 
 
Congress further created changes to Article 120, making some improvements 
to the military’s basic sex offense statute; however, some changes were counter-
productive.  Effective June 28, 2012, the sex offenses in Article 120 were 
separated into three distinct sub-sections: Article 120(a) for adult victims, Article 
120(b) for child victims, and Article 120(c) for other sex offenses.  The 
reorganization placed the following offenses under Article 120(a): (a) rape, (b) 
sexual assault, (c) aggravated sexual contact, and (d) abusive sexual contact.  
Article 120(b) defined the same four offenses in relation to child victims.  Other 
changes made may prove to be problematic for prosecutors and, as a result, for 
victims.  The military services continue to face statutory difficulties in prosecuting 
sexual assault offenses that could be corrected with further statutory changes to 
Article 120.  Existing problems include the following: the 2012 Article 120 
changes eliminated “Indecent Act” as an offense, included a problematic definition 
of force, inappropriately increased the emphasis on whether the victim’s fears are 
reasonable, shifted the focus to the accused’s perceptions of whether the victim 
was consenting, and eliminated the burden shift for the affirmative defenses of 
consent and mistake of fact as to consent.  While the DoD and Congress are 
considering different ways of correcting some of these problems (as noted in 
footnote 123, infra), this Article recommends addressing these issues by legislative 
action as suggested in the following section. 
 
1. Indecent Act Offense Eliminated  
 
The 2012 Article 120 legislative revision continued the trend set in 2007 by 
making some offenses more specific.  The legislation created two new offenses 
that at most will affect a handful of cases each year: Article 120(b)(2) subsections 
(C) and (D).  These offenses prohibit sexual assault by “making a fraudulent 
representation that the sexual act serves a professional purpose;” and “inducing a 
                                                                                                                            
 
Essentially, if an accused has sexual intercourse with an intoxicated woman who cannot 
communicate her unwillingness to engage in sexual intercourse, he has a markedly greater chance of 
being convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2)(B) than he would have under the pre-2007 version of 
Article 120(a) because the vague, amorphous concepts in Article 120(a) left more room for 
reasonable doubt.  
32  2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8, at 6.   
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belief by any artifice, pretense, or concealment that the person is another person.”33  
The revisions also eliminated the catch-all offense of “Indecent Act,”34 which is 
not included in the offenses counted in the DoD sex offense reports.
35
  This 
legislative revision also
 
merged the offense of wrongful sexual contact into abusive 
sexual contact, which will affect about one-third of the sexual assault cases.
36
  
In the 2007 revision of Article 120(k), “Indecent Acts with Another” was 
moved from Article 134 to Article 120, eliminating the element of prejudicial to 
good order and discipline or service discrediting conduct, and the President 
removed “Indecent Acts with Another” as an offense under Article 134.37  
“Indecent Acts with Another”38 traditionally proscribed a variety of sexual 
misconduct not otherwise prohibited, such as consensual sexual intercourse in the 
presence of others
39
 and sex acts with an animal or a corpse.
40
  Under the 2007 
                                                                                                                            
33  10 U.S.C. 120(b)(1)(C), (D) (2012); see also 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra 
note 8, at 503–04 (citing CAL. PEN. CODE § 261(a)(4)(D), (5)).  
34  Paragraph 90 of the Manual for Courts-Martial, United States (2008), “Indecent acts with 
another” was deleted by Executive Order 13447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56179 (Oct. 2, 2007).  See 2012 MCM, 
supra note 6, at Apps. 25, 27.  In the 2007 version, “Indecent Act” was moved from Article 134 to 
Article 120(k).  
35  See DEP’T OF DEF., I ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY 3 (2012) [hereinafter 
2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, VOL. I].  Wrongful sexual contact (580 offenses) and abusive 
sexual contact (308 offenses) were the most serious sex offenses cited in 35% of the unrestricted 
reports (2,558 offenses).  Id. at 62.  If a subject commits a rape and wrongful sexual contact, the 
offense for statistical purposes in the 2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT VOL. I is counted as the 
most serious offense:  rape.  Thus, the number of wrongful sexual contact offenses may be 
substantially higher.  DEP’T OF DEF., II ANN. REP. ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY (2012) 
[hereinafter 2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, VOL. II]. 
36
  2012 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, VOL. I, supra note 35, at 62.  
37  2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 90 (“90. Deleted—See Appendix 27 Indecent acts 
with another was deleted by Executive Order 13447, 72 Fed. Reg. 56179 (Oct. 2, 2007).  See 
Appendix 25.”).  The 2007 Article 120 revision adopted the traditional maximum punishment for 
indecent acts from Article 134 of dishonorable discharge, forfeiture of all pay and allowances, and 
confinement for five years.  Compare 2012 MCM, supra note 6, App. 27, at ¶ 90(e) (Article 134 
offense of indecent act), with 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶ 45(f)(6) (2007 Article 120 
offense of indecent act).  
38  2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra note 8, at 87, 199.   
39 See United States v. Tollinchi, 54 M.J. 80, 83 (C.A.A.F. 2000); United States v. Brundidge, 
17 M.J. 586, 587 (A.C.M.R. 1983).  
40  United States v. Sanchez, 11 U.S.C.M.A. 216, 221, 29 C.M.R. 32, 34 (1960) (holding anal 
sodomy of a chicken is indecent per se); United States v. Mabie, 24 M.J. 711, 713 (A.C.M.R. 1987) 
(determining sex acts with corpse are indecent); see also United States v. McDaniel, 39 M.J. 173, 175 
(C.M.A. 1994) (finding it an indecent act to instruct female recruits to disrobe, change positions, and 
bounce up and down while videotaping them without their knowledge); United States v. Proctor, 34 
M.J. 549, 557–59 (A.F.C.M.R. 1992) (holding it was an indecent act to spank young boys on the bare 
buttocks).  The 2007 Article 120 also prohibited viewing and various types of photography and 
videotaping of intimate actions of another without permission, based on COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-3-
404(1.7) (2004).  The definition of “indecent conduct” in the 2007 Article 120(t)(12) includes 
voyeurism and unauthorized videotaping as crimes.  See 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO THE JSC, supra 
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Article 120, the “Indecent Act” offense was a lesser-included offense for most sex 
offenses under Article 120.
41
 
 The 2012 version, however, inexplicably deleted the prohibited “indecent” 
conduct from Article 120, which is even more problematic due to the removal of 
“Indecent Acts with Another” from Article 134 in 2007.42  Despite the 
congressional (Article 120 revisions) and presidential changes (Article 134 
modification), “indecent” conduct may still be a chargeable offense under Article 
134 (general article), an offense prejudicial to good order and discipline or service 
discrediting conduct.  Furthermore, the DoD seems to have recognized this issue 
and, on October 23, 2012, proposed adding the new offense of “Indecent Conduct” 
to Article 134.
43
  Nevertheless, prosecuting indecent conduct offenses pursuant to 
Article 134—either as a general article violation or one as proposed by the DoD—
requires proving beyond a reasonable doubt an additional element of proof, 
                                                                                                                            
note 8, at 195 n.694 (describing Colorado law as the source for this provision).  The 2012 Article 120 
specifically added broadcasting and distributing a recording of a person engaged in intimate actions 
to the videotaping and viewing prohibitions.  2012 Article 120c(a)(4)–(5).  Under both the 2007 and 
2012 versions of Article 120 the fact finder must determine whether the conduct at issue is indecent; 
the statute provides a definition of indecent taken from traditional military case law.  Military law 
also recognizes that some sex acts at the appellate level are “indecent conduct per se.”  United States 
v. Littlewood, 53 M.J. 349, 353 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (holding sexual activity between a twelve-year-old 
girl and her natural father was indecent per se).  
41  See 2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV, at ¶¶ d(2)(a), d(6)(a), d(7)(a), d(9)(a), d(10)(a), e(1), 
e(3), e(5)(a), e(5)(c), e(5)(d), e(5)(e), e(8).  
42  Paragraph 90 of the MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES (2008), which 
prohibited indecent acts under Article 134, was deleted by Executive Order 13447, 72 Fed. Reg. 
56179 (Oct. 2, 2007).  See 2012 MCM, supra note 6, at Apps. 25, 27.  The 2007 Article 120 followed 
the traditional military justice scheme and included indecent statements or indecent exposure to a 
child as a separate offense from indecently touching a child.  See 2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at 
subsection (j) (prohibiting indecent liberties with a child); 2012 MCM, supra note 6, App. 27, at ¶ 87 
(“Article 134—(Indecent acts or liberties with a child)”).  The 2012 Article 120 merged the two 
offenses and prohibited four types of lewd acts in the expanded sexual abuse of a child offense in 
2012 Article 120b(c) by incorporating the offenses into a complex definition of “lewd act” in 2012 
Article 120b(h)(5).  “This combination of offenses was intended to capture the gravamen of the 
offenses while maintaining the simplicity that was desired for counsel, judges, and members.  Any 
lewd act with a child of any age is punishable under this subsection.”  See Arts. 120, 120b, 120c, 43, 
and 118, UCMJ – DOD PROPOSED NDAA FY 11 AMENDMENTS, as included in S. 3454 BY SENATE 
ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE, JUNE 4, 2010 16 (2010) [hereinafter 2010 DOD PROPOSED 
AMENDMENTS].  
43  Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 205, October 23, 2012, 64865–66 proposes that the offense 
of Indecent Conduct be added to the Manual for Courts-Martial, explaining that, “Indecent conduct 
includes offenses previously prescribed by ‘Indecent acts with another’ except that the presence of 
another person is no longer required.  For purposes of this offense, the words ‘conduct’ and ‘act’ are 
synonymous.” Id. at 64866.  The proposed offense of indecent conduct will have the following 
elements: “(1) That the accused engaged in a certain conduct; (2) That the conduct was indecent; and 
(3) That, under the circumstances, the conduct of the accused was to the prejudice of good order and 
discipline in the [A]rmed [F]orces or was of a nature to bring discredit upon the [A]rmed [F]orces.”  
Id. at 64865–66.  The new manual provision also defines the term “indecent.”  Id. at 64866. 
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conduct prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting.  
Additionally, Article 134 offenses do not receive the same degree of judicial 
deference from CAAF as statute-based offenses.
44
  Thus, prohibiting indecent 
conduct or indecent acts under Article 134 is problematic at the trial level for the 
prosecutor who must prove the additional element, and at the appellate level, 
where the MCM provision is given limited deference.  These weaknesses are not 
present if the conduct is prohibited in a statutory provision within Article 120.  
Adding the offense of “Indecent Acts” into Article 120 (as reflected in the 
proposed legislation in the Appendix to this article) would be more beneficial for 
the government.  The 2007 offense of “Indecent Act” in Article 120(k) along with 
the definition of the term “indecent conduct” in Article 120(t)(12) should be 
returned to the UCMJ as a statutory catch-all offense. 
 
2. Revised Definition of Force  
 
The 2012 Article 120(g)(5) defines “force” as: 
 
(A)  the use of a weapon; 
(B) the use of such physical strength or violence as is sufficient to 
overcome, restrain, or injure a person,
45
 or 
(C) inflicting physical harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by 
the victim
46
 
 
The 2012 Article 120 limits “force” to situations where a weapon is used as 
opposed to displayed or suggested.  Article 120(g)(5)(C) was changed from 
“sufficient that the other person could not avoid or escape the sexual conduct” to 
two degrees of force: (B) “sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person” and 
(C) “sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim.”  Under the current 
Article 120’s definition, unlike the 2007 version, the degree of force to compel the 
victim’s submission is more subjective and places less emphasis on whether the 
                                                                                                                            
44   See supra note 30. 
45  See United States v. Johnson, 492 F.3d 254, 257 (4th Cir. 2007) (noting 18 U.S.C. § 
2241(a)(1) requires force “sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person; or the use of a threat of 
harm sufficient to coerce or compel submission by the victim”); United States v. Weekley, 130 F.3d 
747, 754 (6th Cir. 1997) (quoting United States v. Fire Thunder, 908 F.2d 272, 274 (8th Cir. 1990)) 
(“A force sufficient to sustain a conviction . . . includes ‘the use of such physical force as is sufficient 
to overcome, restrain or injure a person; or the use of a threat of harm sufficient to coerce or compel 
submission by the victim.’”); United States v. Lauck, 905 F.2d 15, 17 (2d Cir. 1990) (“[T]he 
requirement of force may be satisfied by a showing of . . . the use of such physical force as is 
sufficient to overcome, restrain, or injure a person . . . .”).   
46 The rationale for the amendment of the force definition was to simplify it from its previous 
iteration.  2012 MCM, supra note 6, App. 23, at ¶ 45.  The physical harm “sufficient to coerce or 
compel submission by the victim” language is from Johnson, 492 F.3d at 257.  The threat component 
is defined in Article 120(g)(7). 
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victim had the opportunity to escape or avoid the sexual assault.
47
  However, to 
better protect victims, the definition of force should include suggesting possession 
of a dangerous weapon.  Article 120(g)(5) should include: “(A) the use, display, or 
the suggestion of use, of a weapon.”48    
 
3. The “Reasonable Person” Restriction for Victims  
 
In addition to addressing “Indecent Acts with Another” and the definition of 
force, the DoD should also solicit Congress to change the definition of 
“threatening or placing a person in fear” to recognize and protect vulnerable 
victims.  The 2012 Article 120(g)(7) defines “threatening or placing that other 
person in fear” as “a communication or action that is of sufficient consequence to 
cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the victim or another 
person being subjected to the wrongful action contemplated by the communication 
or action.”49  The 2012 Article 120(g)(7) requires a showing of the victim’s 
“reasonable fear,” as opposed to proof of the victim’s subjective fear, thus giving 
                                                                                                                            
47  Jim Clark, Analysis of Crimes and Defenses 2012 UCMJ Article 120, effective 28 June 
2012, 2012 LEXIS EMERGING ISSUES 6423 (2012), 
http://www.lexisnexis.com/documents/pdf/20120705060050_large.pdf.  See also Major Jennifer S. 
Knies, Two Steps Forward, One Step Back:  Why the New UCMJ’s Rape Law Missed the Mark, and 
How an Affirmative Consent Statute Will Put it Back on Target, 2007 ARMY LAW. 1, 6 (2007).  The 
2007 Article 120(t)(5)(C) provided one of three components of force to be, “action to compel 
submission of another or to overcome or prevent another’s resistance by . . . (C) physical violence, 
strength, power, or restraint applied to another person, sufficient that the other person could not avoid 
or escape the sexual conduct.”  
48  The 2007 Article 120 included “(A) the use or display of a dangerous weapon or object.”  
2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (t)(5).  Rhode Island provides an example of a 
definition of force that includes the “threat of use:”   
(2) “Force or coercion” means when the accused does any of the following: 
      (i) Uses or threatens to use a weapon, or any article used or fashioned in a manner to 
lead the victim to reasonably believe it to be a weapon. 
      (ii) Overcomes the victim through the application of physical force or physical 
violence. 
      (iii) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to use force or violence on the victim 
and the victim reasonably believes that the accused has the present ability to execute 
these threats. 
      (iv) Coerces the victim to submit by threatening to at some time in the future murder, 
inflict serious bodily injury upon or kidnap the victim or any other person and the victim 
reasonably believes that the accused has the ability to execute this threat.  
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-37-1(2) (2014); see State v. Martin, 68 A.3d 467, 473–74 (R.I. 2013) 
(citing R.I. Gen. Laws § 11-37-2 and holding separate “consent” instruction not required where jury 
instructed on force or coercion element).   
49  2012 Article 120, supra note 15, at subsection (g)(7) (emphasis added). 
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greater weight to the victim’s mental state in deciding whether to comply with 
demands for sex.  As a result, an accused may benefit by selecting a more 
vulnerable victim who may comply through fear; such a vulnerable victim may 
succumb in response to a lower level communication or action than that required to 
meet the “reasonable” person standard.  The phrase “a reasonable fear” should be 
replaced with “the victim to fear.”  
 
4. Eliminate Charge Based on the Accused’s Perception of the Victim’s 
Behavior 
 
Another provision in the 2012 Article 120 that should be modified is the 
provision that results in focusing on the accused’s perception of the victim’s 
behavior.  The 2012 Article 120(b)(2)(3) describes “sexual assault” as when an 
accused: 
 
(2) commits a sexual act upon another person when the person knows or 
reasonably should know that the other person is asleep, unconscious, or 
otherwise unaware that the sexual act is occurring; or 
(3) commits a sexual act upon another person when the other person is 
incapable of consenting to the sexual act due to— 
 (A) impairment by any drug, intoxicant, or other similar substance, and 
that condition is known or reasonably should be known by the person; or  
   (B) a mental disease or defect, or physical disability, and that condition 
is known or reasonably should be known by the person; is guilty of 
sexual assault and shall be punished as a court-martial may direct.
50
    
 
This statutory provision requires the government to prove that the accused 
“knows or reasonably should know” the victim’s state of consciousness.  Even if 
the victim testifies about her capacity to consent or ability to resist, the government 
must prove the accused’s knowledge or at least that the accused should have 
known.  The accused may testify and describe the victim’s behavior to disprove his 
knowledge of the victim’s condition and support the defense theory of mistake of 
fact as to consent.   
To further protect victims, this additional element should be deleted and the 
following language from the 2007 Article 120(c), the offense of aggravated sexual 
assault
51
 should be imported into Article 120:  
 
                                                                                                                            
50  2012 Article 120, supra note 15, at subsections (b)(2)(3) (emphasis added).  These 
elements are also contained in the definition of “marriage” in 2012 Article 120b(f).  
51  The 2012 amendment to Article 120 changed the name of the offense and deleted the term 
“aggravated.”   
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[a]ny person . . . who—(2) engages in a sexual act with another person of 
any age, if that other person is substantially incapacitated or substantially 
incapable of—(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act; (B) declining 
participating in the sexual act; or (C) communicating unwillingness to 
engage in the sexual act; is guilty of aggravated sexual assault.
52
 
 
This provision primarily reflected the Title 18 offense of sexual abuse,
53
 with 
the addition of the word “substantially” which was added in this proposed 
language to reduce the possibility that the fact finder might acquit based on the 
belief that the victim might need to be completely incapable of appraising the 
nature of the conduct or communicating unwillingness to engage in the sex act.  
Under the proposed provision, the victim need only testify that she lacked capacity 
or was intoxicated to the extent where she was incapable of resisting the 
defendant’s advances or consenting to the sexual activity because she was asleep, 
passed out from alcohol, or too impaired to communicate lack of consent.  
 
5. Affirmative Defenses of Consent and Mistake of Fact as to Consent   
 
The 2012 Article 120 included changes in response to an appellate case that 
provided a review of the affirmative defense of consent.  One of the 2012 changes, 
the elimination of the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent from the 
statute, should be reconsidered.   
 
i. Affirmative Defense of Consent and Burden Shifting   
 
The 2007 Article 120(r) limited the applicability of the affirmative defenses of 
consent and mistake of fact as to consent to specific offenses
54
 and added a 
                                                                                                                            
52  2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (c)(2).  
53  Title 18 criminalized the following:  
Whoever . . . knowingly (1) causes another person to engage in a sexual act by 
threatening or placing that other person in fear (other than by threatening or placing 
that other person in fear that any person will be subjected to death, serious bodily 
injury, or kidnapping); or (2) engages in a sexual act with another person if that other 
person is (A) incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct; or (B) physically 
incapable of declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, 
that sexual act; or attempts to do so, shall be fined under this title and imprisoned for 
any term of years or for life.  
18 U.S.C. § 2242 (2007).  
54  2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (r) stated:  
(r) Consent and mistake of fact as to consent. Lack of permission is an element of the 
offense in subsection (m) (wrongful sexual contact).  Consent and mistake of fact as to 
consent are not an issue, or an affirmative defense, in a prosecution under any other 
subsection, except they are an affirmative defense for the sexual conduct in issue in a 
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provision (similar to other affirmative defenses) establishing an initial burden of 
preponderance of evidence before the prosecution had the burden of proving these 
affirmative defenses did not exist.
55
  The defense’s requirement to fulfill an initial 
burden as to consent was based on District of Columbia Code § 22-3007, which 
provided, “[c]onsent by the victim is a defense which the defendant must establish 
by a preponderance of the evidence.”56 
Affirmative defenses involving a shift in the burden of proof are not unusual 
in criminal law.
57
 For example, the defendant has a specified initial burden
58
 in 
                                                                                                                            
prosecution under subsection (a) (rape), subsection (c) (aggravated sexual assault), 
subsection (e) (aggravated sexual contact), and subsection (h) (abusive sexual contact).  
55 2007 Article 120, id. at (t)(16) stated:  
 
Affirmative defense. The term “affirmative defense” means any special defense which, 
although not denying that the accused committed the objective acts constituting the 
offense charged, denies, wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility for those acts.  The 
accused has the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a preponderance of 
evidence.  After the defense meets this burden, the prosecution shall have the burden of 
proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the affirmative defense did not exist.  
56  In Russell v. United States, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals upheld the 
constitutionality of this statute, but cautioned “that the jury should be expressly instructed that it may 
consider the affirmative defense evidence when it determines whether the government has met its 
burden to prove all the elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.”  698 A.2d 1007, 1015–16 
(D.C. 1997). D.C. Law 1888 amended D.C. CODE §§ 22-3002–07 in 2009, deleting “which the 
defendant must establish by a preponderance of the evidence” following “a defense.”  See also Hatch 
v. United States, 35 A.3d 1115, 1125 (D.C. 2011) (reversing because of confusion over burdens in 
instructions relating to consent in sexual abuse prosecution); Gaynor v. United States, 16 A.3d 944, 
94546 (D.C. 2011) (same).  
57  See JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN’S FEDERAL EVIDENCE, § 
303.06[1] (Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2013) (discussing presumptions in affirmative defenses in 
criminal cases).   
58  In most jurisdictions, the judiciary through case law determines what evidence is sufficient 
to meet the burden, but the judiciary has not set a bright-line rule determining how much evidence is 
necessary to meet that burden:  
 
 [T]he precise dimensions of this burden of production remain inexact; [courts] have 
established no bright-line rule . . . as to the quantum of proof which will enable the 
proponent to cross the threshold and warrant a charge to the jury . . . [The case has not yet 
arisen] to delineate what evidence actually suffices to meet the defense’s burden of 
production.  
 
United States v. Rodriguez, 858 F.2d 809, 81214 (1st Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (stating 
that placing the burden of providing some evidence “on a criminal defendant is by no means 
unprecedented”).  For example, “[e]ntrapment consists of two prongs: (1) improper [g]overnment 
inducement of the crime, and (2) lack of predisposition on the part of the defendant to engage in the 
criminal conduct.”  United States v. LaFreniere, 236 F.3d 41, 44 (1st Cir. 2001) (citations omitted) 
(internal quotation marks omitted).  “Once the defendant meets his initial burden of showing 
entitlement to an instruction on the [entrapment] defense, the burden shifts to the government to 
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raising the affirmative defense of insanity by clear and convincing evidence,
59
 self-
defense by a preponderance of evidence,
60
 and all affirmative defenses in 
trafficking in counterfeit goods by a preponderance of evidence.
61
  
Nevertheless, in 2011, CAAF agreed with defense assertions that the defense 
burden to establish “consent,” by a preponderance of evidence involved an 
unconstitutional shifting of the burden of proof to the accused in a case involving 
the victim’s intoxication.  The Prather court stated: 
 
If an accused proves that the victim consented, he has necessarily proven 
that the victim had the capacity to consent, which logically results in the 
accused having disproven an element of the offense of aggravated sexual 
assault—that the victim was substantially incapacitated . . . . [O]ne 
principle remains constant—an affirmative defense may not shift the 
burden of disproving any element of the offense to the defense.
62
  
                                                                                                                            
prove beyond a reasonable doubt either that there was no undue government pressure or trickery or 
that the defendant was predisposed.”  Id. at 4445 (internal citations omitted). 
59  See, e.g., United States v. Waagner, 319 F.3d 962, 964 (7th Cir. 2003) (stating that under 
18 U.S.C. § 17(b), the defendant “must carry the burden of proving insanity (which is an affirmative 
defense) by clear and convincing evidence”).  The Eighth Circuit explained:  
We believe that this statutorily imposed higher burden of proof calls for a correlating 
higher standard for determining the quantum of evidence necessary to entitle a defendant 
to such an instruction . . . . The Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have adopted the 
following standard to define the quantum of evidence necessary to obtain an insanity 
instruction: where the issue of insanity has otherwise been properly raised, a federal 
criminal defendant is due a jury instruction on insanity when the evidence would allow a 
reasonable jury to find that insanity has been shown with convincing clarity. 
United States v. Long Crow, 37 F.3d 1319, 1323 (8th Cir. 1994) (internal citation omitted); see 
also UCMJ, art. 50a(b),10 U.S.C.A. § 850a(b) (stating that the accused must prove affirmative 
defense of lack of mental responsibility by clear and convincing evidence).  
60  Smart v. Leeke, 873 F.2d 1558, 156365 (4th Cir. 1989) (As self-defense is an affirmative 
defense, the defendant could properly be given the burden of proving the affirmative defense by a 
preponderance of evidence.).  
61  See 18 U.S.C. § 2320(c) (“All defenses, affirmative defenses, and limitations on remedies . 
. . shall be applicable in a prosecution under this section . . . [and] the defendant shall have the burden 
of proof, by a preponderance of the evidence, of any such affirmative defense.”); United States v. 
McEvoy, 820 F.2d 1170, 1173 (11th Cir. 1987) (holding the imposition of the burden of proof for 
affirmative defenses on the defendant is constitutional because the “statute still requires that the 
government prove every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt”).  Also, under The 
Victim and Witness Protection Act, the defendant’s affirmative defense must meet the initial burden 
by providing a preponderance of the evidence that: 1) “the conduct consisted solely of lawful 
conduct,” and 2) “that defendant’s sole intention was to encourage, induce, or cause the other person 
to testify truthfully.”  18 U.S.C.A. § 1512(e) (2008).   
62  United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338, 343 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding that Article 120, by 
placing the burden on the accused to raise the issue of consent as an affirmative defense to a sexual 
assault prosecution and then shifting the burden to the defense to disprove an implied element of the 
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The court found the initial burden shift was unconstitutional, and the second 
burden shift, while moot in the case at bar, was “a legal impossibility.”63  The 
Prather decision was controversial in part because it essentially restored consent as 
an implied element in intoxication-based sex offenses, even though Congress had 
eliminated “without consent” from the 2007 Article 120. 
In the wake of the Prather decision, the DoD recommended that Congress 
eliminate the initial burden that the accused show consent by a preponderance of 
the evidence.
64
  Specifically, the DoD requested that Congress repeal Articles 
120(r) and 120(t)(16), without explaining how deleting consent and mistake of fact 
as to consent as affirmative defenses improved Article 120 for prosecutors, judges, 
court members, or victims. 
Unfortunately, by removing the provisions describing these affirmative 
defenses, Congress may have removed the clear statutory definition of mistake of 
fact as to consent and may have returned “consent” of the victim as an implied 
element of force in intoxication-based sex crimes.  In effect, this may return 
victims to the statutory situation under the original 1950 Article 120 when the 
UCMJ became law.  In the absence of clear statutory language, the courts will 
resolve these critical issues on a case-by-case basis, which will in all likelihood 
                                                                                                                            
offense in violation of due process, created a legal impossibility); see also United States v. Medina, 
69 M.J. 462, 46566 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding that instructions that included consent as a defense to 
the charge of aggravated sexual assault and the prosecution had the burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt that consent did not exist were harmless error where the members were not 
instructed of the statutory scheme that required an accused to prove by a preponderance of the 
evidence that the victim consented).  
63  Prather, 69 M.J. at 345 (footnote omitted). 
64  2010 DOD PROPOSED AMENDMENTS, supra note 42.  The proposed amendments provide:  
The definition of consent was left generally unchanged.  The restrictions on the use of 
evidence of consent were deleted.  The circular language in the current law using nearly 
the same words to explain the interaction of consent and capacity, as were used to define 
an offense under Sexual Assault, was deleted.  The Constitutional and other legal issues 
that have developed in litigation regarding Article 120, as amended in 2007, are resolved.  
The treatment of consent is simplified and may be disputed where it is relevant.  
Categories of persons who may not legally give consent to sexual acts or contact are set 
forth within the statute to simplify the matters at issue in court.  For example, the 
proposed change makes it clear that sleeping or unconscious persons cannot consent.  At 
least two court members’ panels within the last year have acquitted in sexual assault 
cases due to confusion over this issue.  Persons subjected to a fraudulent representation of 
a professional purpose to accomplish the act, or under the belief that the person 
committing the act is another person, cannot consent because they do not understand to 
what they are consenting.  Lack of consent was made a permissive inference based on the 
circumstances of the offense.  
Id. at 15. 
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result in a lack of predictability and consistency, and, inevitably, hard won 
convictions being reversed on appeal.   
 
ii. Affirmative Defense of Mistake of Fact as to Consent.   
 
The 2012 Article 120 contains a definition of consent but does not provide 
clear language about mistake of fact as to consent.  This leaves military judges 
without a statutory definition from which to craft a jury instruction.   
Some states have determined that the “mistake of fact as to consent” 
instruction is not constitutionally required and the consent instruction is 
sufficient.
65
  “As a general proposition, a defendant is entitled to an instruction as 
to any recognized defense for which there exists evidence sufficient for a 
reasonable jury to find in his favor.”66  Nevertheless, Massachusetts law provides 
that “mistake of fact as to consent . . has very little application” to the rape statute, 
which “does not require proof of a defendant’s knowledge of the victim’s lack of 
consent or intent to engage in nonconsensual intercourse as a material element of 
the offense.”67  Moreover, in Massachusetts, the defendant’s “perception 
(reasonable, honest, or otherwise) . . . as to the victim’s consent is consequently 
not relevant to a rape prosecution.”68  In U.S. District Courts, the trial judges are 
not required to provide a mistake of fact as to consent instruction.
69
   
                                                                                                                            
65  In Clifton v. Commonwealth, the defendant claimed that he had a prior sexual relationship 
with the victim and that she consented on the date of the offense.  468 S.E.2d 155, 157 (Va. Ct. App. 
1996).  The trial judge instructed the jury, “[c]onsent by [the victim] is an absolute bar to conviction 
of rape.  If, after consideration of all the evidence, you have a reasonable doubt as to whether [the 
victim] consented to have intercourse with him, then you shall find him not guilty.”  Id.  The 
defendant asked for the following instruction:  
If you find the defendant actually believed that [the victim] was consenting to have 
sexual intercourse, and if his belief was reasonable, then you shall find him not guilty.  
The burden is on the Commonwealth to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
defendant either knew that [the victim] did not consent to sexual intercourse, or that a 
reasonable person in the position of the defendant would have known that [the victim] did 
not consent to sexual intercourse.  
Id. at 158.  
The Clifton court noted that the defendant “may testify as to his observations or perceptions of 
statements or conduct by the victim suggesting consent.”  Id.  However, the trial judge is not required 
to instruct the jury on the defendant’s perceptions of the victim’s consent.  Id.  
66  Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988); Taylor v. Withrow, 288 F.3d 846, 852 
(6th Cir. 2002).  
67  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 966 (Mass. 2001).  
68  Id. (citing Rosana Cavallaro, Big Mistake: Eroding the Defense of Mistake of Fact About 
Consent in Rape, 86 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 815, 818 (1996)).  
69  Aggravated sexual abuse by force or threat in the 2007 Article 120 was derived from 18 
U.S.C. § 2241(a).  In United States v. Martin, the accused was charged with aggravated sexual abuse 
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As for the military, the CAAF has pointed out that the fact finder must be 
instructed to consider all evidence (including the evidence the accused raises that is 
pertinent to the affirmative defense) when determining whether the prosecution 
established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
70
  Prior to the major Article 120 
                                                                                                                            
by force or threat under 18 U.S.C. §2241(a).  528 F.3d 746, 75253 (10th Cir. 2008).  Although there 
was evidence of the defendant’s prior consensual sexual relationship with the victim, Martin did not 
testify on the merits.  His attorney requested the following instruction:  
Consent is willingness in fact for conduct to occur.  Consent may be manifested by action 
or inaction and need not be communicated to the actor.  If words or conduct are 
reasonably understood by another to be intended as consent, they constitute apparent 
consent and are as effective as consent in fact. 
Id. at 753. 
The Tenth Circuit noted that the instructions correctly stated the law and required “the 
government to prove that threat or force caused the sexual act.”  Id.  The Martin court explained the 
role of consent and mistake of fact as to consent as follows: 
Under the statute, actual consent is relevant to the extent it negates the required causation.  
But merely apparent consent does not negate causation, because it is apparent, not real.  It 
is therefore not necessarily true that “apparent consent” is “as effective as consent in 
fact.”  “Apparent consent” might be relevant to disproving a defendant’s mens rea in 
some cases, but only by negating knowingness, the second element of the crime, not by 
negating the causation requirement embodied in the first and third.  The proffered 
instruction improperly equated actual and apparent consent, and also failed to explain 
how either form of consent related to the elements the jury was required to find. 
Id. 
In United States v. Rivera, the trial judge instructed the jury “that to find Rivera guilty of 
aggravated sexual abuse, they had to conclude, inter alia, that he caused Natasha ‘to engage in a 
sexual act by: (a) the use of force against Natasha; or (b) by threatening or placing her in fear that any 
person will be subjected to death or serious bodily [injury].’”  43 F.3d 1291, 1298 (9th Cir. 1995).  
Rivera’s defenses were that he did not use force and that the victim consensually engaged in 
intercourse rather than out of fear.  The Rivera court noted, “[t]he United States is not required to 
show that the victim did not consent to the sexual act, nor is the prosecution required to show that the 
victim resisted.”  Id. at 1297.  The defense requested two instructions.  The first stated, “Consent to 
sexual intercourse is a total defense to the charges against Defendant of aggravated sexual abuse and 
sexual abuse.”  The second stated, “[W]hether consent to intercourse was given rests on whether an 
alleged victim of ordinary resolution would not offer resistance or that because of reasonable fear of 
harm, a woman of ordinary resolution would not offer resistance.”  Id. at 129798.  The Ninth Circuit 
affirmed the trial judge’s decision not to give these special consent instructions concluding, “the 
district court instructed the jury to find Rivera guilty only if they concluded he used force or threats 
to engage in intercourse with Natasha.  If he did not (i.e., Natasha consented), they were to find him 
not guilty.”  Id. at 1298.  
70  United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289, 303 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (“If [evidence of the affirmative 
defense of consent] is introduced, the military judge must instruct the members to consider all of the 
evidence, including the evidence of consent, when determining whether the government has proven 
guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.”).  The CAAF reviews allegations of instructional error regarding 
affirmative defenses “under a de novo standard of review.”  United States v. Lewis, 65 M.J. 85, 87 
(C.A.A.F. 2007) (citing United States v. Bean, 62 M.J. 264, 266 (C.A.A.F. 2005); United States v. 
Forbes, 61 M.J. 354, 357 (C.A.A.F. 2005)).  Allegations of error “rais[ing] constitutional 
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modification, military case law applicable to rape cases (unlike federal court case 
law
71
) was protective of the accused; essentially, military courts had established a 
very minimal evidentiary requirement to obtain a mistake of fact as to consent 
instruction, requiring an instruction in any case raising consent as an affirmative 
defense.  Such an instruction was required even in cases where the defendant 
simply testified that consent was unequivocal, or even where the accused did not 
testify and the possibility of mistake of fact was raised through cross-examination 
of the victim about her failure to aggressively deflect the accused’s advances and 
failure to instruct on this defense caused conviction reversals.
72
  In United States v. 
Brown,
73
 the CAAF admonished any military judge who did not provide a mistake 
of fact as to consent instruction stating: 
 
 [l]astly, it is hard to believe that . . . [the] Military Judges’ Benchbook . . 
. does not have a statement in 2-inch high letters, “INSTRUCT ON 
REASONABLE AND HONEST MISTAKE IN ALL RAPE CASES 
INVOLVING CONSENT UNLESS THE DEFENSE COUNSEL 
AGREES THAT THE DEFENSE IS NOT RAISED.” . . . Why invite an 
appellate issue?
74
  
 
The 2012 Article 120 turned the focus to the accused’s mental state by adding 
known or reasonably should be known,
75
 making it easier for the accused to defend 
his conduct by simply testifying, thus incorporating the mistake of fact as to 
consent defense into the offenses themselves.  The Massachusetts Supreme Court 
warned against this shift stating, “[a] shift in focus from the victim’s to the 
defendant’s state of mind might require victims to use physical force in order to 
                                                                                                                            
implications, [are] tested for prejudice using a ‘harmless beyond a reasonable doubt’ standard.”  Id. 
(citing United States v. Wolford, 62 M.J. 418, 420 (C.A.A.F. 2006)).  
71  Martin, 528 F.3d at 753.  
72  United States v. Jones, 49 M.J. 85, 91 (C.A.A.F. 1998) (stating “[T]he appellate court 
below erred to the extent it possibility suggested that and accused must testify in order that a mistake-
of-fact instruction be given”); see also United States v. DiPaola, 67 M.J. 98, 100 (C.A.A.F. 2008) 
(reversing indecent assault conviction and holding “The evidence to support a mistake of fact 
instruction can come from evidence presented by the defense, the prosecution or the court-martial.”  
It is not necessary for an accused to testify in order to establish a mistake of fact defense.); United 
States v. Tollinchi, 54 M.J. 80, 81–83 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (reversing the jury’s finding of guilty of rape 
because of the accused’s mistake of fact as to the recruit’s consent even though the accused did not 
testify that sex occurred).   
73  43 M.J. 187, 190 (C.A.A.F. 1995). 
74  Id. (emphasis in original); see United States v. Gamble, 27 M.J. 298, 308 (C.M.A. 1988) 
(determining that even though accused and victim drank alcohol together in his apartment at 1:00 am, 
and even though he did not testify that he believed she consented, he was entitled to a mistake of fact 
instruction and his conviction was reversed).  
75  See supra note 50 and accompanying text.  
2014 SEX OFFENSES UNDER MILITARY LAW 461 
 
 
 
communicate an unqualified lack of consent to defeat any honest and reasonable 
belief as to consent.”76  
Since military judges are required by case law to provide an instruction 
regarding mistake of fact as to consent, even though some states have decided that 
such an instruction is not constitutionally required, military law should include a 
provision to limit the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent in sexual 
assault cases by including a statutory provision.  The 2007 Article 120(t)(15) 
which was repealed (without explanation) in 2012 defined the affirmative defense 
of mistake of fact as to consent and thus, significantly limited its scope.  The 2007 
provision provided: 
 
Mistake of fact as to consent.  The term “mistake of fact as to consent” 
means the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect 
belief that the other person engaging in the sexual conduct consented.  
The ignorance or mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused 
and must have been reasonable under all the circumstances.  To be 
reasonable, the ignorance or mistake must have been based on 
information, or lack of it, that would indicate to a reasonable person that 
the other person consented.  Additionally, the ignorance or mistake 
cannot be based on the negligent failure to discover the true facts.  
Negligence is the absence of due care.  Due care is what a reasonably 
careful person would do under the same or similar circumstances.  The 
accused’s state of intoxication, if any, at the time of the offense is not 
relevant to mistake of fact.  A mistaken belief that the other person 
consented must be that which a reasonably careful, ordinary, prudent, 
sober adult would have had under the circumstances at the time of the 
offense.  A reasonable mistake of fact may not be found that is based 
upon ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of 
conduct by the accused that amounts to force, violence, duress, menace, 
or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of the 
alleged victim or another.
77
  
                                                                                                                            
76  Commonwealth v. Lopez, 745 N.E.2d 961, 967 (Mass. 2001). 
77  2007 Article 120, supra note 7, at subsection (t)(15); see also 2005 SEX CRIMES REPORT TO 
THE JSC, supra note 8, at 10305 (stating that the definition of consent is drawn from statutes and 
case law from states including Vermont, Utah, Washington State, Washington, D.C., Illinois, Florida, 
California, Colorado, and Minnesota).  The last sentence of the definition is added to the 2007 Article 
120 statutory definition of mistake of fact to further limit the scope of the mistake of fact defense as 
to consent and this sentence is based on 18 CAL. JUR. 3d. § 562 (West 2013) (citing People v. 
Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. Ct. App. 992)).  Incorporation of California’s case law on the mistake 
of fact defense effectively limits the scope of the mistake of fact defense.  See People v. Lee, 248 
P.3d 651, 668 (Cal. 2011) (quoting JOHN M. DINSE, ET AL., CALIFORNIA JURY INSTRUCTIONS, 
CRIMINAL §10.65 (West Group, 7th ed. 2005)).  In some cases, a physically dominant defendant may 
use bodily force or threats, and the victim may become compliant, believing resistance is futile or to 
avoid injury.  At trial, the defendant may deny making the threat and claim the victim either outright 
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The 2007 provision (with the added sentence at the end included above) 
should be returned as part of the statutory structure of Article 120.  With the 
present state of Article 120 and in the absence of a statutory definition for this 
affirmative defense, it is unclear how the President may define mistake of fact as to 
consent, and whether the CAAF will accept that definition.  Eliminating the 
“accused state of intoxication” as a factor in this affirmative defense is particularly 
problematic.
78
  Under the 2012 Article 120, the accused has the opportunity to 
parlay his alcohol consumption into an acquittal, especially with the statutory focus 
on the accused’s state of mind and knowledge at the time of the offense.   
The Eighth Circuit recently addressed a controversy involving the necessity of 
the prosecution to prove the accused’s knowledge of the victim’s intoxication.79  In 
Bruguier, the victim was intoxicated, passed out on the floor of the kitchen, and 
had no memory of what happened to her.  The defendant said she was awake and 
consented to sexual activity with him.
80
  The Eighth Circuit held the use of 
“knowingly” in 18 U.S.C. § 2242(2) “requires a defendant to know the victim was 
                                                                                                                            
consented or consented by complying with his demands.  This provision will eliminate the 
application of the mistake of fact defense under these scenarios.  
78  Some may conclude that because the 2012 MCM, Rule for Courts-Martial [RCM] 916(j)(3) 
(established by executive order) includes the 2007 Article 120(t)(15) definition of mistake of fact, 
eliminating the statutory definition of mistake of fact in the UCMJ punitive Article 120 for sexual 
assaults is harmless.  It is unclear, however, how future MCMs will address this affirmative defense.  
Moreover, the President has not yet implemented the 2012 changes to Article 120: 
The subparagraphs that would normally address elements, explanation, lesser[-]included 
offenses, maximum punishments, and sample specifications are generated under the 
President’s authority to prescribe rules pursuant to Article 36.  At the time of publishing 
this MCM, the President had not prescribed such rules for this version of Article 120.  
Practitioners should refer to the appropriate statutory language and, to the extent 
practicable, use Appendix 28 as a guide.  
2012 MCM, supra note 6, pt. IV at ¶ 45.  
Two additional problems are evident from the repeal of Article 120(t)(15) and retention of the 
affirmative defense in RCM 916(j)(3): (1) appellate courts may interpret the repeal of 2007 Article 
120(t)(15) as Congressional intent that this RCM definition (pursuant to executive order) was flawed; 
and (2) the CAAF may conclude that the President lacks authority to define the terms of the mistake 
of fact defense because it is substantive law.  See supra note 30 and accompanying text (explaining 
that very little deference is given to the President’s statements about substantive law in the MCM).    
79 United States v. Bruguier, 735 F.3d 754 (8th Cir. 2013) (en banc); United States v. Rouillard, 
701 F.3d 861 (8th Cir. 2012), vacated and rehearing en banc granted, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS 15795 
(8th Cir. S.D., Mar. 4, 2013). 
80  Bruguier, 735 F.3d at 756–57 (“Bruguier testified that [the victim] kept asking him to 
dance after he arrived at her house and that they kissed and had consensual sex.  He testified that 
[she] was conscious, moving, and moaning throughout their sexual encounter and that she never 
asked him to stop.”). 
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‘incapable of appraising the nature of the conduct’ or ‘physically incapable of 
declining participation in, or communicating unwillingness to engage in, that 
sexual act,’” and the trial judge committed reversible error when he failed to 
instruct the jury accordingly.
81
  The dissent concludes “that Congress opted to 
place the risk of error about incapacity on the sexual aggressor . . . the correct and 
most natural grammatical reading of § 2242(2) does not apply any knowledge 
requirement to the victim's incapacity . . .”82  The Bruguier dissent noted: 
 
[A]lmost all of the sexual assault cases which have been brought 
under § 2242(2) arise from abuse of alcohol or drugs in 
situations where intent may be difficult to establish.  Concerns 
about practical enforceability therefore reinforce the natural 
grammatical reading of § 2242(2) that knowledge of incapacity 
is not an element of the offense. 
 
The type of case now before us has not allowed the government 
easily to convict defendants.  In the past ten years, the district 
courts in our circuit have conducted twenty-nine trials in which 
defendants were charged under § 2242(2) and the jury instructed 
that the “knowingly” requirement applied only to the defendant’s 
engagement in the sexual act and not to the victim’s incapacity.  
Nevertheless, nearly half of the defendants were acquitted of the 
charges under § 2242(2) (thirteen out of twenty-nine).
83
 
 
iii. Initial Burden for the Affirmative Defenses of Mistake of Fact as to 
Consent 
 
The 2007 Article 120’s definition of mistake of fact as to consent should be 
reinstated in Article 120 to ensure statutory publication of the various internal 
limitations on the scope of the mistake of fact as to consent defense.  A statutory 
definition provides transparency to victims and non-lawyers who cannot assess the 
scope of this defense, which is otherwise buried in case law.  Moreover, a statutory 
definition increases stability since it is less subject to judicial interpretation and 
reversal of convictions when a trial judge’s instructions do not comport with an 
appellate body’s views.  Limiting judicial discretion restricts the defense’s scope 
and thus ensures a more victim-oriented defense.   
Article 120 should also be amended to restrict this defense’s applicability 
since Congress may require the accused’s defense to bear the burden of raising, 
establishing, or proving an affirmative defense (subject to due process restrictions 
                                                                                                                            
81  Id. at 76061. 
82  Id. at 779. 
83  Id. at 778. 
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on impermissible presumptions of guilt).
84
  The CAAF indicated the burden-
shifting scheme in the 2007 Article 120(t)(16)
85
 for applying the consent defense 
was confusing and unconstitutional.
86
  In California, the affirmative defense of 
mistake of fact as to consent in sex offenses (known as the Mayberry Defense
87
) is 
based on case law rather than statute.
88
  California’s Mayberry Defense reflects the 
2007 version of Article 120 with two variances, which the military could adopt to 
avoid the issues raised regarding the unconstitutional burden shifting.   
In California, the defense has the initial burden of showing there is 
“substantial evidence of equivocal conduct that would have led a defendant to 
reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed where it did not.”89  
“Evidence is . . . [substantial when], if believed by the [trier of fact], [it is] 
sufficient to raise a reasonable doubt [about the defendant’s guilt].”90  At the same 
time, a defendant is only entitled to jury instructions as to a defense “for which 
there exists evidence sufficient for a reasonable jury to find in his favor.”91   
In California, the judge, not the jury, must make a threshold finding that the 
evidence with respect to consent is substantial and equivocal.
92
  If this requirement 
is not met, the judge does not provide the jury instruction regarding the affirmative 
defense of mistake of fact as to consent.  This requirement, in effect, virtually 
eliminates the mistake of fact as to consent doctrine in California because 
defendants who unequivocally assert the other person consented receive the 
consent instruction and not the mistake of fact as to consent instruction. 
                                                                                                                            
84  United States v. Neal, 68 M.J. 289, 298301 (C.A.A.F. 2010). 
85  See supra note 55 and accompanying text.  
86  United States v. Prather, 69 M.J. 338, 338 (C.A.A.F. 2011).  
87  See James v. McDonald, No. 2:11CV022580(JKS), 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 165947, at 
*28–*33 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 16, 2012) (citing People v. Mayberry, 542 P.2d 1337 (Cal. 1975)) 
(affirming trial judge’s decision not to instruct on Mayberry Defense).  
88  18 CAL. JUR. 3d. § 562 (West 2013).  
89  People v. Martinez, 224 P.3d 877, 908 (Cal. 2010) (emphasis added) (citing People v. 
Williams, 841 P.2d 961 (Cal. 1992)).  In Williams, the court explained that the defendant must have 
“honestly and in good faith, albeit mistakenly, believed that the victim consented to sexual 
intercourse” based upon “evidence of the victim’s equivocal conduct,” and “the defendant’s mistake 
regarding consent [must have been] reasonable under the circumstances.”  Williams, 841 P.2d at 965.  
This mistake of fact instruction “should not be given absent substantial evidence of equivocal 
conduct that would have led a defendant to reasonably and in good faith believe consent existed 
where it did not.”  Id. at 966.  See also Athans v. Vasquez, No. CV 052676(RGK), 2010 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 77726, at *58 (C.D. Cal. 2010) (denying habeas corpus despite California trial court’s failure 
to give requested mistake of fact instruction).  
90  People v. Salas, 127 P.3d 40 (Cal. 2006).  
91  Mathews v. United States, 485 U.S. 58, 63 (1988).  
92  Martinez, 224 P.3d at 908.  
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For example, Williams illustrates the application of the California rule.  The 
trial court held that the mistake of fact as to consent defense was applicable 
because Deborah (the alleged victim) stated that she and Williams (the defendant) 
went to a hotel room to watch television, and she did not object when Williams 
received sheets from the hotel clerk.
93
  The Supreme Court of California found 
otherwise, stating: 
 
Williams testified that Deborah initiated sexual contact, fondled him to 
overcome his impotence, and inserted his penis inside herself.  This 
testimony, if believed, established actual consent.  In contrast, Deborah 
testified that the sexual encounter occurred only after Williams blocked 
her attempt to leave, punched her in the eye, pushed her onto the bed, 
and ordered her to take her clothes off, warning her that he did not like to 
hurt people.  This testimony, if believed, would preclude any reasonable 
belief of consent.  These wholly divergent accounts create no middle 
ground from which Williams could argue he reasonably misinterpreted 
Deborah’s conduct.94 
  
The lower court relied on Williams’ statement describing consent and the fact 
that the hotel clerk did not describe any screams emanating from the defendant’s 
room.
95
  On appeal, the Supreme Court of California reversed the lower court, 
affirmed Williams’s conviction, and held “there was no substantial evidence of 
equivocal conduct warranting an instruction on reasonable and good faith mistake 
of fact as to consent to sexual intercourse in this case.”96  
The California rule limiting the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to 
consent has been in effect more than twenty years
97
 and California trial judges 
have successfully applied it in numerous sexual assault cases.  The affirmative 
defense of mistake of fact as to consent requires structure within Article 120.  To 
ensure a statutory framework, “mistake of fact as to consent” from the 2007 Article 
120(t)(16) should be returned to Article 120 as subsection (g) (Definitions) section 
                                                                                                                            
93  Williams, 841 P.2d at 966–67.  
94  Id. at 966.    
95  Id. at 966–67. 
96  Id. at 967.  The California Supreme Court also recommended that “[t]he jury should, 
however, be further instructed, if appropriate, that a reasonable mistake of fact may not be found if 
the jury finds that such equivocal conduct on the part of the victim was the product of ‘force, 
violence, duress, menace, or fear of immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person or another.’”  
Id. at 968.  
97  Id. at 961.  
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(9), 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(9) (as discussed above) and the following provisions 
should be added to Article 120(f) (Defenses)
98
 as subsection (1): 
 
Affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent.   
The term “affirmative defense” means any special defense that, although 
not denying that the accused committed the objective acts constituting 
the offense charged, denies, wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility 
for those acts.  The military judge shall not instruct the members that 
there is a defense of mistake of fact as to consent: (1) if the defense 
evidence is unequivocal consent and the prosecution’s evidence is of 
non-consensual forcible sex; or (2) unless substantial evidence has been 
presented on the merits
99
 that the mistake of fact affirmative defense, as 
defined in section Article 120(g)(9), 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(9)
100
 applies.    
 
C. Impact of Military Law Regarding Lesser-Included Offenses   
 
Issues regarding lesser-included offenses in turn impact charging decisions, 
unreasonable multiplication of charges and multiplicity challenges, and jury 
instruction choices. These issues cause confusion in criminal trials generally; the 
same is true in the case of Article 120 sexual assault cases in the military justice 
system.
101
  For example, multiple sex acts during one episode may be charged 
separately.
102
  When available lesser-included offenses decrease, the government 
may charge more offenses by dividing a single event into different offenses, 
protecting against the exigencies of proof.
103
  Essentially, “[a]ll American 
                                                                                                                            
98  2012 Article 120, supra note 15, at section (f) states, “(f) Defenses.—An accused may raise 
any applicable defenses available under this chapter or the Rules for Court-Martial.  Marriage is not a 
defense for any conduct in issue in any prosecution under this section.”  
99  The military judge should wait until after all of the evidence is presented on the merits 
before deciding whether a mistake of fact as to consent instruction is warranted.  See supra notes 69 
& 70. 
100 The proposed definition of mistake of fact as to consent in the new Article 120(g)(9) is the 
same as in the 2007 Article 120(t)(16).  See supra note 55.    
101 Lesser-included offenses and multiplicity have been described as creating “‘chaos’ and 
[being the] ‘Sargasso Sea’ of military and federal law” and “a vortex that sucks in all sorts of debris . 
. . and causes great suffering.”  Captain Gary E. Felicetti, Surviving the Multiplicity/LIO Family 
Vortex, 2011 ARMY LAW. 46 (Feb. 2011) (tracing the morass of multiplicity and lesser-included 
offenses in military law).  “No area of law relating to jury instructions has created more confusion 
than that governing when a court may or must put before the jury for its decision a lesser-included 
offense.”  WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.8(d) (2d ed. 1984).  
102 See United States v. Plenty Chief, 561 F.3d 846 (8th Cir. 2009) (separate specifications 
charging touching breasts and attempted digital penetration may be charged); United States v. Two 
Elk, 536 F.3d 890 (8th Cir. 2008) (finding separately charged aggravated sexual abuse specifications 
of anal and vaginal penetration during the same incident are not multiplicious).  
103 Felicetti, supra note 101, at 51.  
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jurisdictions recognize lesser-included offenses as a device that permits a jury to 
acquit a defendant of a charged offense and instead to convict of a less serious 
crime that is necessarily committed during the commission of the charged 
offense.”104  The confusion occurs first when determining what offenses to charge 
to capture all criminal conduct and which lesser offenses fall under the charged 
offense, and then providing appropriate jury instructions.
105
  Three tests exist to 
determine what lesser-included offenses fall under the charged offense:  the 
statutory elements test, the evidentiary approach, and the cognate-pleading test.
106
  
Determining what lesser-included offenses fall within a charged offense 
became clearer for the Armed Forces when in 2010, in United States v. Jones, the 
CAAF mandated that military courts use the elements test that other federal courts 
use, stating that:   
 
[u]nder the elements test, one compares the elements of each offense.  If 
all of the elements of offense X are also elements of offense Y, then X is 
an [lesser-included offense] LIO of Y.  Offense Y is called the greater 
offense because it contains all of the elements of offense X along with 
the one or more additional elements.
107
 
                                                                                                                            
104 Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Rise and Fall of Lesser Included Offenses, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 
351, 354 (2005) (footnotes omitted).  
105 Michael H. Hoffheimer, The Future of Constitutionally Required Lesser Included Offenses, 
67 U. PITT. L. REV. 585, 588 (2006).  
106 State v. Keller, 695 N.W.2d 703, 707 (N.D. 2005) (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 5 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 24.8(e) (2d ed. 1984)) (listing the three tests and stating: 
Under the “statutory elements” approach, the elements of the offense must be such that it is 
impossible to commit the greater offense without committing the lesser.  “The statutory-
elements approach, which was the original common law position, is used today in the federal 
courts and in a growing number of states.”  Under the “evidentiary” approach, the instruction 
would be appropriate if the facts of the case would permit an accused to be convicted of a less 
serious offense even if the elements do not make it impossible to commit the greater without 
committing the lesser offense.  The “cognate pleadings” approach looks to the pleadings rather 
than to the evidence introduced.  The evidentiary and cognate-pleadings approaches have been 
criticized as being unclear and placing both the prosecutor and defense in an untenable 
position, because they open the door for so many potential lesser-included offenses.) (citations 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  In the “inherent[-]relationship” test, “the greater and 
lesser offenses “must relate to protection of the same interests, and must be so related that in 
the general nature of these crimes, though not necessarily invariably, proof of the lesser offense 
is necessarily presented as part of the showing of the commission of the greater offense.” 
United States v. Horn, 946 F.2d 738, 744 n.5 (10th Cir. 1991) (citation omitted).  In Horn, the Tenth 
Circuit abandoned the “inherent[-]relationship test” and returned to “elements test” also known as 
“the impossibility test” because if the elements of a lesser offense must be a subset of the greater 
offense, then it is impossible to commit the greater offense without first having committed the lesser.  
Id. at 744 (citing United States v. Brown, 604 F.2d 557, 560–61 (8th Cir. 1979)).  
107 United States v. Jones, 68 M.J. 465, 470 (C.A.A.F. 2010).  
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In mandating the elements test, the CAAF merely followed the Supreme 
Court’s direction.108  Further establishing the elements test, the court in United 
States v. Fosler reversed a conviction for adultery and reinforced the constitutional 
requirement for notice pleading, stating: 
 
This test [the elements test] requires that “the indictment contain[] the 
elements of both offenses and thereby give[] notice to the defendant that 
he may be convicted on either charge.”. . . The military is a notice 
pleading jurisdiction.  A charge and specification will be found sufficient 
if they, “first, contain[] the elements of the offense” charged and fairly 
inform[] a defendant of the charge against which he must defend, and, 
second, enable[] him to plead an acquittal or conviction in bar of future 
prosecutions for the same offense.”  The rules governing court-martial 
procedure encompass the notice requirement:  “A specification is 
sufficient if it alleges every element of the charged offense expressly or 
by necessary implication.”109  
 
As for instructions, the CAAF determined that pursuant to the elements test, 
“the elements of the lesser-offense are a subset of the elements of the charged 
offense.  Where the lesser offense requires an element not required for the greater 
offense, no instruction [regarding a lesser included offense] is to be given.”110 The 
CAAF agreed that a lesser-included offense must be included in the greater offense 
stating: 
 
The basic test to determine whether the court-martial may properly find 
the accused guilty of an offense other than that charged is whether the 
specification of the offense on which the accused was arraigned alleges 
fairly, and the proof raises reasonably, all elements of both crimes so that 
they stand in the relationship of greater and lesser offenses.
111
 
 
The presence of Article 120 definitions makes it easier to delineate lesser-
included offenses and to identify the accused’s acts that must be proven to 
                                                                                                                            
108 United States v. Bonner, 70 M.J. 1, 2 (citing Jones, 68 M.J. at 472); Schmuck v. U.S., 489 
U.S. 705, 716 (1989).  
109 United States v. Fosler, 70 M.J. 225, 22829 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (citations omitted).  
110 Bonner, 70 M.J. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Alston, 
69 M.J. 214 (C.A.A.F. 2010) and Schmuck, 489 U.S. at 716).  
111 Jones, 68 M.J. at 469 (quoting United States v. Virgilito, 22 U.S.C.M.A. 394, 395–96, 47 
C.M.R. 331, 332–33 (1973)).  
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establish guilt.
112
  The elements test, as applied to Article 120, may, however, 
cause cautious military prosecutors (trial counsel) to charge multiple sex offenses 
to increase the probability of a conviction.  Multiple sex offense charges may 
mislead or confuse panel members who will see the multiple charges on the flyer 
(a document provided to the military jury at the start of the court-martial). 
Additionally, the CAAF requires instructions on all lesser-included offenses if 
evidence is presented to support the lesser-included offense.  The court has 
concluded: 
 
When evidence is adduced during the trial which “reasonably raises”. . . 
a lesser-included offense, the judge must instruct the court panel 
regarding . . . [the] lesser-included offense . . . .  [T]his Court [has] held 
that [i]nstructions on lesser-included offenses are required unless 
affirmatively waived by the defense . . . As the defense did not 
affirmatively waive an instruction on [the lesser-included offense] in this 
case, the military judge was required to instruct on the lesser-included 
offense . . . if the evidence reasonably raised it.
113
  
                                                                                                                            
112 Bonner, 70 M.J. at 3 (assault consummated by a battery is a lesser-included offense of 
wrongful sexual contact); United States v. Wilkins, 71 M.J. 410, 412 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (affirming 
conviction of lesser-included offense “[b]ecause abusive sexual contact piggybacks the definition of 
aggravated sexual assault, all of the elements of the two offenses necessarily line up, except that 
aggravated sexual assault requires a ‘sexual act’ whereas abusive sexual contact requires ‘sexual 
contact’”); Alston, 69 M.J. at 21516 (affirming aggravated sexual assault conviction as a lesser-
included offense of a rape).  The difficulties with charging lesser-included offenses involving sex 
offenses preceded the reform of 2007 Article 120.  See Jones, 68 M.J. at 473 (reversing conviction of 
indecent acts with another, holding indecent acts with another is not a lesser-included offense of the 
pre-2007 Article 120 version of rape); United States v. Burleson, 69 M.J. 165 (C.A.A.F. 2010) 
(same).  
113 United States v. Davis, 53 M.J. 202, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2000) (internal citations and quotation 
marks omitted) (fourth alteration in original); United States v. Wells, 52 M.J. 126, 129 (C.A.A.F. 
1999) (citations omitted) (“Military law goes further [than federal civilian law].  It requires a trial 
judge to give such an instruction on a lesser[-]included offense ‘sua sponte . . . for which there is . . . 
some evidence which reasonably places the lesser[-]included offense in issue.’”).  Appellate litigation 
in the past several years has focused on problematic lesser-included sex offenses charged as Article 
134 offenses, offenses prejudicial to good order and discipline or service discrediting conduct.  Until 
recently, courts-martial practice permitted instructions to the fact finder on lesser-included offenses 
such as indecent assault and indecent acts (Article 134), when rape (Article 120), or forcible sodomy 
(Article 125) was charged.  See United States v. Schoolfield, 40 M.J. 132, 137 (C.M.A. 1994) 
(“[A]lthough indecent acts requires a service disorder or discrediting circumstances, such an element 
is included by implication in Article 120.”); United States v. Foster, 40 M.J. 140, 143 (C.M.A. 1994), 
overruled in part by United States v. Miller, 67 M.J. 385, 38889 (C.A.A.F. 2009).  In 2010, the 
CAAF reversed an accused’s conviction of indecent acts, holding that indecent acts (an Article 134 
offense) was not a lesser-included offense of rape (an Article 120 offense).  Jones, 68 M.J. at 473.  In 
United States v. Fosler, the court held that the terminal element of prejudice to good order and 
discipline or service discrediting conduct in adultery in violation of Article 134 was not necessarily 
implied in the specification and would not survive a motion to dismiss.  70 M.J. at 22932.  
Additionally, an allegation in the specification that accused “wrongfully” engaged in adulterous 
conduct did not imply the terminal element.  Id.  The CAAF further changed the rules on charging 
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Traditionally, the CAAF employed “a liberal standard in determining whether 
an offense is lesser included in one that is charged.”114  This broad interpretation 
urged military trial judges to give defense counsel great leeway and liberally grant 
requests for instructions on lesser-included offenses.  
With the CAAF’s declaration of the elements test and required notice 
pleading—providing the accused with adequate notice as the offenses charged115—
coupled with the revamped Article 120, trial counsel found themselves charging 
additional offenses that have different elements.
116
  In response to concerns that 
lesser-included offenses relating to charging decisions and panel instructions were 
causing confusion after the 2006 revision of Article 120, the DoD ordered a review 
and sought suggestions about the charging of sex offenses.
117
  Some military 
                                                                                                                            
Article 134 offenses in United States v. Humphries, holding, “that the accused was prejudiced by the 
failure to allege the terminal element in a contested Article 134, UCMJ, 10 U.S.C. § 934 (2006), 
specification.”  Wilkins, 71 M.J. at 414 n.4 (C.A.A.F. 2012) (citing United States v. Humphries, 71 
M.J. 209, 217 (C.A.A.F. 2012)).  
114 United States v. McVey, 4 U.S.C.M.A. 167, 175, 15 C.M.R. 167, 175 (1954) (Brosman, J., 
concurring) (“Traditionally this Court has worn an outsize pair of spectacles in viewing the problem 
of lesser included offenses, and has applied an extremely generous standard in determining whether a 
related offense is included within the principal one.  I am sure of the overall soundness of this 
policy.”).  
115 Fosler, 70 M.J. at 22829.  
116 Jones, 68 M.J. at 465; United States v. Medina, 66 M.J. 21, 27 (C.A.A.F. 2008); Miller, 67 
M.J. at 385; Fosler, 70 M.J. at 225.  
117 REPORT OF THE DEFENSE TASK FORCE ON SEXUAL ASSAULT IN THE MILITARY SERVICES 
8081 (Dec. 2009) [hereinafter DTFSAMS REPORT 2009].  Subsequently, on October 23, 2012, the 
DoD proposed amending the Manual for Courts-Martial to clarify when an offense is a lesser-
included offense, citing United States v. Ballan, 71 M.J. 28 (C.A.A.F. 2012); Fosler, 70 M.J. at 225; 
and Jones, 68 M.J. at 465 to explain the necessity of this change.  Federal Register, Vol. 77, No. 205, 
October 23, 2012, p. 64885–86.  The proposed Manual change reads: 
(b) Paragraph 3b, Article 79, Lesser[-]Included Offenses, is amended to read as follows: 
b. Explanation.  
(1) In general. A lesser offense is “necessarily included” in a charged offense when the 
elements of the lesser offense are a subset of the elements of the charged offense, thereby 
putting the accused on notice to defend against the lesser offense in addition to the 
offense specifically charged. A lesser offense may be “necessarily included” when: 
(a) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, and the 
common elements are identical (for example, larceny as a lesser included offense of 
robbery); 
(b) All of the elements of the lesser offense are included in the greater offense, but one 
or more elements is a subset by being legally less serious (for example, housebreaking as 
a lesser included offense of burglary); or  
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prosecutors indicated that the charging of multiple offenses on the charge sheet and 
complex, lengthy jury instructions confused panel members and might be resulting 
in acquittals.
118
  
Since the Article 120 offenses were primarily modeled after Title 18 sex 
offenses,
119
 one might expect that the same problems would have surfaced through 
the years of prosecuting hundreds of Title 18 sexual assault offenses;
120
 however, 
there is no evidence that Assistant U.S. Attorneys have blamed unsuccessful 
prosecutions on confusing jury instructions or multiple charges.  Military courts-
martial practice regarding charging and instructions as they relate to lesser-
included offenses is now more consistent with practice in U.S. district courts.
121
  
Federal courts have imposed a more restrictive method of evaluating lesser-
included offense instructions by generally applying the five-factor test which 
entitles a defendant to a lesser-included offense instruction when:  
 
(1) a proper request is made; (2) the lesser-offense elements are identical 
to part of the greater-offense elements; (3) some evidence would justify 
conviction of the lesser offense; (4) there is evidence such that the jury 
                                                                                                                            
(c) All of the elements of the lesser offense are “included and necessary” parts of the 
greater offense, but the mental element is a subset by being legally less serious (for 
example, wrongful appropriation as a lesser included offense of larceny). 
(2) Sua sponte duty. A military judge must instruct panel members on lesser included 
offenses reasonably raised by the evidence. 
(3) Multiple lesser included offenses. When the offense charged is a compound offense 
comprising two or more included offenses, an accused may be found guilty of any or all 
of the offenses included in the offense charged.  For example, robbery includes both 
larceny and assault.  Therefore, in a proper case, a court-martial may find an accused not 
guilty of robbery, but guilty of wrongful appropriation and assault. 
(4) Findings of guilty to a lesser[-]included offense. A court-martial may find an accused 
not guilty of the offense charged, but guilty of a lesser[-]included offense by the process 
of exception and substitution.  The court-martial may except (that is, delete) the words in 
the specification that pertain to the offense charged and, if necessary, substitute language 
appropriate to the lesser[-]included offense. 
Id. at 64856–57. 
118 See 2010 DOD SEXUAL ASSAULT REPORT, supra note 12; see also, Jane A. Minerly, The 
Interplay of Double Jeopardy, the Doctrine of Lesser Included Offenses, and the Substantive Crimes 
of Forcible Rape and Statutory Rape, 82 TEMP. L. REV. 1103, 110304 (2009).   
119 See United States v. Booker, 72 M.J. 787, 805 (N.M.C.C.A. 2013) (citations omitted).  
120 The regime of Title 18 sexual abuse offenses has been in effect for twenty-seven years. 18 
U.S.C. § 2241–45 were added November 10, 1986, by P.L. 99-646, § 87(b), 100 Stat. 3620. 
121 United States v. Bonner, 70 M.J. 1, 3 (C.A.A.F. 2011) (holding that assault consummated 
by a battery is a lesser-included offense of wrongful sexual contact); United States v. Alston, 69 M.J. 
214, 21516 (C.A.A.F. 2010) (holding that aggravated sexual assault is a lesser-included offense of 
rape by force).   
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may find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser-
included-offense; and (5) mutuality.”122   
 
To provide further structure and restrictions for courts, Congress should 
legislatively import this five-factor test into the military justice system, 
establishing greater consistency and predictability.  Such action may be 
accomplished by the legislation proposed and attached to this article as an 
appendix.  
 
IV. GOOD MILITARY CHARACTER EVIDENCE:  CHANGING THE MILITARY RULES 
OF EVIDENCE TO BETTER PROTECT VICTIMS 
 
In addition to statutory changes to the sexual assault punitive articles, some 
limits should be made to the admissibility of evidence of the accused’s good 
military character during courts-martial for sexual assault offenses.  Although 
President Obama signed the National Defense Authorization Act into law in 
December 2013
123
 and that law includes a provision reducing the influence the 
                                                                                                                            
122 United States v. Meeks, 639 F.3d 522, 528 (8th Cir. 2011) (citing United States v. 
Crawford, 413 F.3d 873, 876 (8th Cir. 2005)); United States v. Parker, 32 F.3d 395, 40001 (8th Cir. 
1994);  see also David E. Rigney, Annotation, Propriety of Lesser-Included-Offense Charge to Jury 
in Federal Criminal Case—General Principles, 100 A.L.R. FED. 481, 49596 (Westlaw 2011) 
(stating federal courts either use the Meeks five-factor test or a four-factor test, eliminating the 
mutuality test and listing numerous cases applying these tests); United States v. LaPointe, 690 F.3d 
434, 43940 (6th Cir. 2012) (applying four-factor test).  
123 The House Armed Services Committee summarized the sexual assault prevention 
provisions in the 2014 National Defense Authorization Act [NDAA] as follows: 
 
The legislation includes over 30 provisions or reforms to the Uniform Code of Military 
Justice related to combatting sexual assault in the military. These reforms would strip 
commanders of their authority to dismiss a finding by a court-martial—a power they have 
held since the earliest days of our military. It would also prohibit commanders from 
reducing guilty findings to guilty of a lesser offense. Where servicemembers are found 
guilty of sexual assault related offenses the NDAA establishes minimum sentencing 
guidelines. Currently, such guidelines only exist in the military for the crimes of murder 
and espionage.  Personnel records will now include information on sex-related offenses. 
Recognizing that victim support is as vital as prosecution, the NDAA would allow 
victims of sexual assault to apply for a permanent change of station or unit transfer, while 
authorizing the Secretary of Defense to inform commanders of their authority to remove 
or temporarily reassign servicemembers who are the alleged perpetrators of sexual 
assault. The NDAA requires the provision of victims’ counsel, qualified and specially 
trained lawyers in each of the services, to be made available to provide legal assistance to 
the victims of sex-related offenses. The NDAA adds rape, sexual assault, or other sexual 
misconduct to the protected communications of servicemembers, with a Member of 
Congress or an Inspector General—and expands those protections for sexual assault 
crimes. The NDAA eliminates the 5 year statute of limitations on rape and sexual assault. 
To better protect victims’ rights, the NDAA reforms the Article 32 process to avoid 
destructive fishing expeditions and properly focus on probable cause. A number of 
victims’ rights policies are enshrined in statute. Finally, to ensure that the military is 
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accused’s character and military service has on the commander’s disposition 
decision,
124
 that provision will not eliminate the impact of such evidence in the 
courtroom.  
Comparing admissibility of good character evidence in federal court with 
military courts-martial illustrates how broad admissibility under the Mil. R. Evid. 
may also lead to acquittals and, in turn, negatively impact victims.  Some 
modification should be made to these rules to ensure admission of good military 
character evidence is prohibited in cases of violence or sexual activity, unless the 
character trait corresponds to an element of the offense charged. 
 
A. Do the Military Rules of Evidence Provide More Leeway:  A Comparison of the 
Federal and Military Rules of Evidence   
 
Federal Rule of Evidence [Fed. R. Evid.] 404(a) and Mil. R. Evid. 404(a) 
providing for the admissibility of good character evidence are similar but not 
identical.  Fed. R. Evid. 404(a) provides as follows:  
 
Rule 404.  Character Evidence; Crimes or Other Acts  
 (a) Character Evidence. 
   (1) Prohibited Uses.  Evidence of a person’s character or character trait 
is not admissible to prove that on a particular occasion the person acted 
in accordance with the character or trait. 
   (2) Exceptions for a Defendant or Victim in a Criminal Case.  The 
following exceptions apply in a criminal case: 
      (A) a defendant may offer evidence of the defendant’s pertinent trait, 
and if the evidence is admitted, the prosecutor may offer evidence to 
rebut it . . . .  
  
Similarly, Mil. R. Evid. 404(a) provides: 
                                                                                                                            
better positioned to deal with the crisis of sexual assault within its ranks, the NDAA 
requires the Secretary of Defense to assess the current role and authorities of 
commanders in the administration of military justice and the investigation, prosecution, 
and adjudication of offenses under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. 
 
H. ARMED SERVICES COMM., 113TH CONG. FACT SHEET: FY14 NDAA SUMMARY HIGHLIGHTS 
OF THE NATIONAL DEFENSE AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2014 (Dec. 9, 2013), 
http://armedservices.house.gov/index.cfm/files/serve?File_id=127E1D4B-DD70-4B69-80DC-
A036DA7B3519.  The DoD has a variety of ongoing studies, panels, and initiatives designed to 
improve treatment of victims and increase the effectiveness of training and disposition of sex assault 
offenses.  See Schenck, supra note 16, at 592–96, 646–47, 651, 657. 
124 NDAA, section 1708 states, “Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this 
Act, the discussion pertaining to Rule 306 of the Manual for Courts-Martial (relating to policy on 
initial disposition of offenses) shall be amended to strike the character and military service of the 
accused from the matters a commander should consider in deciding how to dispose of an offense.” 
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Rule 404. Character evidence not admissible to prove conduct; 
exceptions; other crimes 
 
(a) Character evidence generally.  Evidence of a person’s character or a 
trait of character is not admissible for the purpose of proving action in 
conformity therewith on a particular occasion, except: 
 
(1) Character of the accused.  Evidence of a pertinent trait of character 
offered by an accused, or by the prosecution to rebut the same, or if 
evidence of a pertinent trait of character of the alleged victim of the 
crime is offered by an accused and admitted under Mil. R. Evid. 
404(a)(2), evidence of the same trait of character, if relevant, of the 
accused offered by the prosecution.   
 
An additional rule of evidence allowing for the admissibility of good 
character evidence in criminal trials is Rule 405.  Here, the distinction between the 
military rule and the federal rule is important and results in facilitating the 
accused’s presentation of specific records reflecting good military character.  Fed. 
R. Evid. 405 provides as follows:  
 
Rule 405.  Methods of Proving Character  
 
(a) By Reputation or Opinion.  When evidence of a person’s character or 
character trait is admissible, it may be proved by testimony about the 
person’s reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  On cross-
examination of the character witness, the court may allow an inquiry into 
relevant specific instances of the person’s conduct. 
  
(b) By Specific Instances of Conduct.  When a person’s character or 
character trait is an essential element of a charge, claim, or defense, the 
character or trait may also be proved by relevant specific instances of the 
person’s conduct. 
 
The first few military and federal 405 provisions seem equivalent, both 
allowing evidence of specific instances in certain cases.  The provision regarding 
admissibility of affidavits or other written statements in the military rules, 
however, further opens the door to good military character evidence.  Mil. R. Evid. 
405 provides: 
 
Rule 405. Methods of proving character 
 
(a) Reputation or opinion.  In all cases in which evidence of character or 
a trait of character of a person is admissible, proof may be made by 
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testimony as to reputation or by testimony in the form of an opinion.  On 
cross-examination, inquiry is allowable into relevant specific instances of 
conduct. 
 
(b) Specific instances of conduct.  In cases in which character or a trait of 
character of a person is an essential element of an offense or defense, 
proof may also be made of specific instances of the person’s conduct. 
 
(c) Affidavits.  The defense may introduce affidavits or other written 
statements of persons other than the accused concerning the character of 
the accused.  If the defense introduces affidavits or other written 
statements under this subdivision, the prosecution may, in rebuttal, also 
introduce affidavits or other written statements regarding the character of 
the accused.  Evidence of this type may be introduced by the defense or 
prosecution only if, aside from being contained in an affidavit or other 
written statement, it would otherwise be admissible under these rules. 
 
(d) Definitions.  “Reputation” means the estimation in which a person 
generally is held in the community in which the person lives or pursues a 
business or profession.  “Community” in the armed forces includes a 
post, camp, ship, station, or other military organization regardless of size. 
 
B. Good Character Evidence in U.S. District Courts   
 
If charged with committing a violent crime, the defendant may present 
specific instances of conduct as proof that the defendant possesses a relevant 
character trait such as “peaceableness.”125  In addition, in federal district courts, a 
defendant has the right to establish the character trait of being a law-abiding citizen 
in every case, not only where the defendant testifies or when dishonesty is an 
element of crime.
126
  Specifically, U.S. District Courts permit reputation and 
opinion testimony regarding law-abiding character because it is almost always a 
pertinent character trait whenever someone is charged with a crime.
127
  For 
example, in United States v. Darland, a case involving a robbery charge, the judge 
erred by excluding evidence of the defendant’s reputation for honesty and integrity 
                                                                                                                            
125 United States v. Giese, 597 F.2d 1170, 1190 (9th Cir. 1979) (“Unlike character witnesses, 
who must restrict their direct testimony to appraisals of the defendant's reputation, a defendant-
witness may cite specific instances of conduct as proof that he possesses a relevant character trait 
such as peaceableness.”).  
126 United States v. Hewitt, 634 F.2d 277, 279 (5th Cir. 1981).  
127 See United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 44748 (D.C. Cir. 2007); see also United States 
v. Angelini, 678 F.2d 380, 381 (1st Cir. 1982) (reversed because evidence of law-abiding character 
not admitted in case where the defendant was charged with possessing with intent to distribute and 
distributing methaqualone).  
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as a law-abiding citizen, and for peacefulness whether or not the defendant 
testified.
128
  However, specific instances of law-abiding character are generally 
excluded.  For example, in United States v. Crockett, the defendant, a former 
police officer, could not prove a character trait with evidence of specific instances 
of good conduct, but character witnesses could testify under Fed. R. Evid. 
404(a)(1), 405(a) as to their opinions that the defendant was a good person and that 
they were not aware that he engaged in any illegal activities.
129
  
Federal courts further exclude evidence of a defendant’s prior good acts in 
criminal prosecutions as character evidence under Fed. R. Evid. 405 when 
character is not an essential element of the particular offenses charged.
130
  For 
example, in United States v. Nazzaro, the court found that the trial judge properly 
excluded the defendant’s (a police officer’s) resume and other anecdotal proof of 
commendations or character evidence as they were not pertinent to the crime of 
stealing civil service exams.
131
  Federal courts have found evidence of a 
defendant’s specific traits of honesty, integrity, truthfulness, and generosity are 
inadmissible under Fed. R. Evid. 405(b) because those traits were not essential 
elements of charges against defendants or any defenses they raised.  Moreover, 
character traits raised by defendants were general character traits, and because they 
were not “essential elements” of crimes or defenses, courts have found that Rule 
405(b) does not permit criminal defendants to admit evidence of specific instances 
of those traits.
132
  
Federal courts may also rely on the Fed. R. Evid. 403 balancing test to 
exclude character evidence.  For example, in United States v. Harris, although the 
defendant’s mother, girlfriend, and coworker testified that the defendant was a 
good father with a reputation for truthfulness, and those character traits were 
pertinent in a drug distribution trial under Fed. R. Evid. 404(a)(1), such evidence 
                                                                                                                            
128 United States v. Darland, 626 F.2d 1235, 123738 (5th Cir. 1980); see also United States v. 
Lechoco, 542 F.2d 84, 88 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (defendant need not testify to make truthfulness a 
pertinent character trait).  
129 United States v. Crockett, 586 F. Supp. 2d 877, 884 (E.D. Mich. 2008).  
130 United States v. Marlinga, 457 F. Supp. 2d 769, 770 (E.D. Mich. 2006).  
131 United States v. Nazzaro, 889 F.2d 1158, 1168 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding character for 
“bravery” and “attention to duty” not pertinent to the charges of mail-fraud conspiracy and perjury); 
see also United States v. Hill, 40 F.3d 164, 169 (7th Cir. 1994) (stating that “law-abidingness” not a 
“pertinent character trait” related to charges of cashing a stolen government check); see also United 
States v. Santana-Camacho, 931 F.2d 966, 96768 (1st Cir. 1991) (holding evidence of character as 
“a good family man” and as “a kind person” are inadmissible because it was not pertinent to the 
illegal transportation of aliens into the country).  
132 See United States v. Marrero, 904 F.2d 251, 25960 (5th Cir. 1990); United States v. 
White, 737 F.3d 1121, 1137 (7th Cir. 2013); United States v. Beverly, 913 F.2d 337, 353 n.23 (7th 
Cir. 1990); United States v. Talamante, 981 F.2d 1153, 1156 (10th Cir. 1992). 
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was properly excluded because its probative value was substantially outweighed by 
danger of unfair prejudice under Fed. R. Evid. 403.
133
  
Nevertheless, federal appellate courts review trial court rulings on 
admissibility of opinion and reputation evidence testimony using an “abuse of 
discretion” standard, and reversals are very rare.  As the D.C. Circuit Court stated 
in Harris, whether reputation testimony should be admissible is best determined at 
the trial level because 
 
Both propriety and abuse of . . . reputation testimony . . . depend on 
numerous and subtle considerations difficult to detect or appraise from a 
cold record, and therefore rarely and only upon clear showing of 
prejudicial abuse of discretion will Courts of Appeals disturb rulings of 
trial courts on this subject.
134
  
 
In United States v. Davis, the court found that excluding a defendant’s prison 
records was not an abuse of discretion because “[r]arely and only after clear 
showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion will appellate courts disturb rulings of 
trial courts admitting [or deciding not to admit] character evidence.”135  
 
C. Good Character Evidence in Courts-Martial  
 
Similar to federal district courts, military trial judges at courts-martial allow 
admission of an accused’s reputation as a law-abiding citizen to show the 
probability of innocence; moreover, since 1951, military courts have admitted 
evidence of an accused’s good military character including military record and 
general character as a moral, well-behaved person.
136
  The accused, “[h]owever, 
                                                                                                                            
133 United States v. Harris, 491 F.3d 440, 44748 (D.C. Cir. 2007). 
134 Id. at 447.  
135 United States v. Davis, 546 F.2d 583, 592 (5th Cir. 1977) (citations omitted).  Additionally, 
the failure to provide a requested instruction on character evidence may be reversible error.  United 
States v. John, 309 F.3d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 2002).  
136 The Manual for Courts-Martial, ¶ 138f(2) provided:  
In order to show the probability of his innocence, the accused may introduce evidence of 
his own good character, including evidence of his military record and standing and 
evidence of his general character as a moral well-conducted person and law-abiding 
citizen.  However, if the accused desires to introduce evidence as to some specific trait of 
character, such evidence must have reasonable tendency to show that it was unlikely that 
he committed the particular offense charged.  For example, evidence of reputation for 
peacefulness would be admissible in a prosecution for any offense involving violence, 
but it would be inadmissible in a prosecution for a non-violent theft.  
MANUAL FOR COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES, ¶ 138f(2) (1951); see also MANUAL FOR 
COURTS-MARTIAL, UNITED STATES,  ¶ 138f(2) (1969 Rev. Ed.).  
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[]may not introduce evidence as to some specific trait of character unless proof of 
that trait would have a reasonable tendency to show that it was unlikely that he 
committed the particular offense charged.”137  
Although no universally accepted definition of “good military character” 
exists, military courts broadly interpret this term to include overall military 
performance as well as evaluations.  Opinions regarding past or future combat 
performance are often admitted into evidence, and it is not unusual for a character 
witness to testify, I “would want to go to war with him [or her],” or I “would trust 
him [or her to have my back] on the battlefield.”138  Dependability, leadership, 
initiative, duty performance, proficiency, promptness, and “take charge and 
accomplish the mission” attitude, are all relevant attributes of a good soldier.139  
Military courts further admit performance evaluation reports as evidence of 
good military character.  Evaluations include traits such as professional 
performance, military behavior, leadership, supervisory ability, military 
appearance, and adaptability, as well as descriptions of assigned tasks and 
performance.
140
  Moreover, military trial judges commit judicial error if they do 
not admit enlisted evaluation reports as part of the good soldier defense.
141
  The 
evaluation forms themselves provide definitions such as: professional performance 
as “skill and efficiency in performing assigned duties;”142 military behavior as 
“[h]ow well the member accepts authority and conforms to the standards of 
military behavior”143 and “[l]eadership and supervisory ability” as “the ability to 
plan and assign work to others.”144  Military appearance is defined as the 
“[m]ember’s military appearance and neatness in person and dress.”145  
There are no recent judicial opinions in which the Service Courts of Criminal 
Appeals or the CAAF held that a military trial judge properly excluded general 
good military character evidence; regardless of the offense charged, the CAAF 
(and its predecessor, the Court of Military Appeals) in the past described the 
                                                                                                                            
137 United States v. Vandelinder, 20 M.J. 41, 44 (C.M.A. 1985).  
138 Randall D. Katz and Lawrence D. Sloan, In Defense of the Good Soldier Defense, 170 MIL. 
L. REV. 117, 131 (2001) (citations omitted).  
139 Id. at 132 (citing United States v. Hallum, 31 M.J. 254, 255 (C.M.A. 1990)); see also 
United States v. Brown, 41 M.J. 1, 7 (C.M.A. 1994) (Crawford, J., dissenting); United States v. True, 
41 M.J. 424, 427 (1995); United States v. White, 36 M.J. 306, 307 (C.M.A.  1993). 
140 Vandelinder, 20 M.J. at 43.  
141 Id. at 4243, 47 (failure to admit reports was harmless error in drug distribution case 
beyond a reasonable doubt).  
142 Id. at 48. 
143 Id.       
144 Id.  
145 Id.  
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failure to admit the evidence as an abuse of discretion and then analyzed for 
prejudice.  Historically, the CAAF evaluated cases for prejudice by employing the 
following four-part test for prejudice: 
 
First: Is the [g]overnment’s case against the accused strong and 
conclusive?
146
  
 
Second: Is the defense’s theory of the case feeble or implausible?147  
 
Third: What is the materiality of the proffered testimony?  Is the question 
whether or not the accused was the type of person who would engage in 
the alleged criminal conduct fairly raised by the [g]overnment’s theory of 
the case or by the defense?
148
  
 
Fourth: What is the quality of the proffered defense evidence and is there 
any substitute for it in the record of trial?
149
 
 
Presentation of good military character evidence—also known as the “good 
soldier defense”150—may shift the panel’s (i.e., military jury’s) attention from the 
criminal offense to the stellar military record of the accused.  If evidence of good 
military character is presented, the accused is entitled to an instruction regarding 
good military character,
151
 further shifting the trial focus and highlighting the 
improbability of guilt.  As the Court of Military Appeals noted, “[t]he well-
recognized rationale for admission of evidence of good military character is that it 
would provide the basis for an inference that an accused was too professional a 
soldier to have committed offenses which would have adverse military 
consequences.”152  Critics of the DoD’s approach to processing military sexual 
assault cases point to the impact of the good soldier defense on military courts-
martial.  While evidence of good military character may be relevant in cases 
involving inherently military offenses such as failure to obey a lawful order and 
dereliction of duty (Article 92, UCMJ), critics argue that such evidence clouds the 
                                                                                                                            
146 United States v. Weeks, 20 M.J. 22, 25 (C.M.A.  1985) (citing United States v. Lewis, 482 
F.2d 632, 644 (D.C. Cir. 1973)) (citations omitted).  
147 Weeks, 20 M.J. at 25 (citing Lewis, 482 F.2d at 646).  
148 Weeks, 20 M.J. at 25 (Cf. Michelson v. United States, 335 U.S. 469 (1948)).   
149 Weeks, 20 M.J. at 25.  
150 See GREGORY MAGGS & LISA SCHENCK, MODERN MILITARY JUSTICE: CASES AND 
MATERIALS 596 (2012).   
151 United States v. Smith, 34 M.J. 341, 342 (C.M.A. 1992) (citing United States v. Pujana-
Mena, 949 F.2d 24, 31 (2d Cir. 1991)).  
152 United States v. Wilson, 28 M.J. 48, 49 n.1 (C.M.A. 1989) (citations omitted).  
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issue of guilt.
153
  Some support for this assertion exists.  For example in 1998, 
Sergeant Major of the Army [SMA] Gene McKinney was charged with nineteen 
specifications of sexual abuse or harassment of six female military subordinates 
(including a captain and a sergeant major) and obstruction of justice.  The jury of 
at least one-third enlisted members convicted him of one specification of 
obstruction of justice (he was tape recorded trying to convince one of the victims 
not to make a statement against him) and reduced his military rank to master 
sergeant.  Several general officers (including a retired four-star general) and an 
assistant secretary of the Army testified regarding SMA McKinney’s good military 
character.  The highest ranking person who testified on behalf of the female 
victims was a lieutenant colonel.  Sergeant Major of the Army McKinney’s 
lawyers stated that his good military character evidence was important and perhaps 
                                                                                                                            
153 Elizabeth Lutes Hillman, The “Good Soldier” Defense: Character Evidence and Military 
Rank at Courts-Martial, 108 YALE L.J. 879 (1999).  Professor Hillman persuasively argues that good 
military character evidence is most relevant when the accused is charged with military offenses, 
stating:  
Courts-martial for offenses defined as “military” present the strongest case for admitting 
evidence of good military character.  Because military law penalizes many acts that are 
not criminal under civilian law, some of the offenses charged at court-martial cannot be 
committed by civilians.  The good soldier defense is most effective at courts-martial for 
these military offenses, particularly for relatively minor charges, such as “conduct 
unbecoming an officer and a gentleman,” abuse of authority, disobedience, and being 
absent without leave.  In short, good military character, presuming that it indicates at 
least something about an accused’s dedication to the military and duty performance, is 
most probative in courts-martial for military offenses. 
Admitting generic good military character evidence in courts-martial for military-specific 
offenses seems consistent with the intent and meaning of Military Rule of Evidence 
404(a)(1); surely “military character” is a pertinent trait when a servicemember is 
accused of being disrespectful, disloyal, sloppy, or otherwise unsoldierly.  Determining 
what constitutes a “military” as opposed to a “non-military” offense, however, may call 
for a nuanced analysis and careful weighing of multiple factors.  Faced with the difficulty 
of making a rule to distinguish “service-connected” from “non-service-connected” 
offenses, the Supreme Court opted to expand court-martial jurisdiction instead.  In the 
context of sex crimes and sexual harassment, a line between a military and a nonmilitary 
offense is especially difficult to draw, since an accused often has abused his position of 
authority in order to commit an offense not specific to the military.  In any case, the 
practice of restricting good soldier testimony to courts-martial involving military offenses 
was abandoned soon after the adoption of the Military Rules of Evidence, when military 
courts eliminated the requirement for a “nexus” between military duty and the charged 
offense.  
 
 Id. at 900–01 (footnotes omitted). 
Professor Hillman contends that a military accused should be treated the same as a defendant in 
other civilian trials and that such evidence should be inadmissible in prosecutions for drug offenses or 
sex crimes.  Id.  Professor Hillman cites ten appellate decisions describing sex offenses in which the 
good soldier character evidence played a role.  Id. at 902903, 902 n.121; see also Wilson, 28 M.J. 
48, 49 n.1.        
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decisive in the acquittal.
154
  To avoid the possibility of jury nullification based on 
the good soldier defense in military sexual assault cases, some change—either 
through Congressional direction to the DoD or by statute—is warranted.   
 
D. Recommendation:  Amend the Manual for Courts-Martial or Enact a New 
Statute 
 
To change the Military Rules of Evidence, the Congress could direct the 
executive branch to amend Mil. R. Evid. 404 and 405, by including the following 
provision in the NDAA: 
 
Not later than 180 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, 
Military Rule of Evidence 404 shall be modified to clarify that military 
character evidence is not admissible to show the probability of innocence 
for any violation of: Articles 118 to 132; Articles 77 to 82 involving 
predicate offenses under Articles 118 to 132; and Articles 133 and 134 
offenses involving violence or sexual misconduct.  However, evidence of 
other specific traits of an accused’s character, including law-abiding 
character, may be offered in evidence when those specific traits are 
relevant to an element of an offense for which the accused is being tried.  
 
Military Rule of Evidence 405(c) shall be deleted to make Military Rule 
of Evidence 405 more consistent with Federal Rule of Evidence 405.   
 
General military character includes but is not limited to past or future 
combat performance, dependability, leadership, initiative, duty 
performance, proficiency, military bearing, and promptness.  Evidence of 
law-abiding character shall be admissible to the same extent as under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404.   
  
Since some risk exists that the executive branch may misinterpret 
Congressional intent, the Congress could enact a statutory change to the UCMJ.
155
  
Congress would maintain more control by providing specific language such as the 
following: 
 
§ 850b. art. 50b. Admissibility of character evidence 
 
In any case, not capital, involving a violation of Articles 118 to 132; 
Articles 77 to 82 involving predicate offenses under Articles 118 to 132; 
                                                                                                                            
154 Hillman, supra note 153, at 907.  
155 See supra note 5 for a discussion of the pending legislation, the Victims Protection Act of 
2014, which includes a provision to limit good character evidence in all cases. 
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and Articles 133 and 134 offenses involving violence or sexual 
misconduct, evidence of military character is not admissible to show 
probability of innocence.  Affidavits or other written statements of 
persons other than the accused, concerning the character of the accused 
or of any other witness, and evidence of law-abiding character shall be 
admissible to the same extent as under Federal Rule of Evidence 405.  
 
General military character includes but is not limited to past or future 
battlefield performance, dependability, leadership, initiative, duty 
performance, proficiency, military bearing, and promptness.  Evidence of 
law-abiding character shall be admissible to the same extent as under 
Federal Rule of Evidence 404.    
 
V. CONCLUSION: RECOMMENDED STATUTORY CHANGES TO PROTECT VICTIMS 
 
In response to the pressure President Barack Obama, Congress, the media, 
and the American public have placed on the DoD to reform its approach to sexual 
assault in the military services, the DoD has conducted multiple reviews and 
launched several investigations into the issue while Congress has implemented 
statutory changes to the UCMJ in 2007 and 2012.  These past and current efforts, 
however, are insufficient to reach the goal of convicting more perpetrators. 
Modifications to the UCMJ and the Military Rules of Evidence could assist 
prosecutors in achieving this goal and better protect victims.  A proposed bill, 
attached as an appendix to this article, includes recommended provisions that could 
do just that.  As the proposed legislation indicates statutory revisions would do the 
following:  1) return the offense of “Indecent Act,” to Article 120 criminal 
offenses; 2) modify the definition of force to be more inclusive by adding 
“suggesting possession of a dangerous weapon”; 3) eliminate the increased 
emphasis on whether the victim’s fears are “reasonable”; 4)  eliminate the focus on 
the accused’s perception of the victim’s behavior; 5) return the statutory 
limitations regarding the affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent; 6) 
adopt California’s evidentiary threshold for giving affirmative defense instructions 
on mistake of fact as to consent and consent; 7) establish a statutory structure 
restricting judicial appellate discretion in determining lesser-included offense 
instructions; and 8) limit good military character evidence in courts-martial for 
crimes of violence and sexual misconduct.  The proposals set forth by this article 
for changing military substantive criminal law (Article 120, UCMJ) and the 
Military Rules of Evidence would result not only in a system more consistent with 
federal and state laws, but also modify the military justice system and in all 
likelihood lead to more convictions for sexual assault offenses in the military 
services.  
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To amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice to provide more consistency with 
federal and state sexual assault statutes and create a more comprehensive sexual 
assault statute for the military Services by: including the offense of “Indecent Act,” 
in Article 120 criminal offenses; defining force to include “suggesting possession 
of a dangerous weapon”; eliminating the increased emphasis on whether the 
victim’s fears are “reasonable”; removing the focus from the accused’s perceptions 
of the victim; limiting the scope of the mistake of fact as to consent defense to 
ensure perpetrators cannot be acquitted by only asserting their perceptions that the 
victims were consenting; adopting California’s evidentiary threshold for giving 
affirmative defense instructions on mistake of fact as to consent and consent; 
establishing a statutory structure restricting judicial appellate discretion in 
determining lesser-included offense instructions; and, limiting good military 
character evidence in courts-martial for crimes of violence and sexual misconduct.   
_______________________ 
 
IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
 
____________________ introduced the following bill; which was referred to the 
Committee on ________________________ 
_______________________________ 
A BILL 
To amend the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ) to provide more 
consistency with federal and state sexual assault statutes and create a more 
comprehensive sexual assault statute for the military Services. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
 of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
        SECTION 1.  SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘‘Military Sexual Assault Reform Act of 2013’’.  
SEC. 2. REINSTATING THE OFFENSE OF INDECENT ACT AS AN OFFENSE 
(a) THE FOLLOWING SECTIONS ARE REINSTATED TO SECTION 920 OF TITLE 10 
U.S. CODE: 
H. R. ______ 
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(a) Indecent act.  Any person subject to this chapter who engages in indecent 
conduct is guilty of an indecent act and shall be punished as a court-martial may 
direct.  
(b) Indecent conduct.  The term “indecent conduct” means that form of 
immorality relating to sexual impurity that is grossly vulgar, obscene, and 
repugnant to common propriety, and tends to excite sexual desire or deprave 
morals with respect to sexual relations. 
SEC. 3. IMPROVEMENT OF THE DEFINITION OF FORCE 
(a) SECTION 920(G) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: 
(a) Section 920(g)(5)(A) is repealed and replaced with “(g)(5)(A) the use, 
display, or the suggestion of use, of a weapon.” 
(b) In Section 920(g)(7), the words “a reasonable” are  repealed and replaced 
with “victim to” from the phrase “a communication or action that is of sufficient 
consequence to cause a reasonable fear that non-compliance will result in the 
victim or another person being subjected to the wrongful action contemplated by 
the communication or action.” 
(c) Section 920(b)(2) is repealed and replaced with “(2) engages in a sexual 
act with another person of any age if that other person is substantially incapacitated 
or substantially incapable of—(A) appraising the nature of the sexual act; (B) 
declining participating in the sexual act; or (C) communicating unwillingness to 
engage in the sexual act; is guilty of aggravated sexual assault.”   
SEC. 4. DECREASING THE EMPHASIS IN SEXUAL ASSAULT PROSECUTIONS 
ON THE PERPETRATOR’S PERCEPTIONS OF THE VICTIM’S CONSENT. 
(a) SECTION 920(F)(1) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE IS ADDED TO THE DEFENSE 
SUBSECTION OF SECTION 920 AS FOLLOWS: 
“(1) Affirmative defense of mistake of fact as to consent.  The term 
“affirmative defense” means any special defense that, although not denying that 
the accused committed the objective acts constituting the offense charged, denies, 
wholly, or partially, criminal responsibility for those acts.  The military judge shall 
not instruct the members that there is a defense of mistake of fact as to consent: (1) 
if the defense evidence is unequivocal consent and the prosecution’s evidence is of 
non-consensual forcible sex; or (2) unless substantial evidence has been presented 
on the merits that the mistake of fact affirmative defense, as defined in section 
Article 120(g)(9), 10 U.S.C. § 920(g)(9) applies.” 
(b) SECTION 920(G)(9) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE IS ADDED TO THE DEFINITION 
SUBSECTION OF SECTION 920 AS FOLLOWS: 
“(9) Mistake of fact as to consent.  The term “mistake of fact as to consent” 
means the accused held, as a result of ignorance or mistake, an incorrect belief that 
the other person engaging in the sexual conduct consented.  The ignorance or 
mistake must have existed in the mind of the accused and must have been 
reasonable under all the circumstances.  To be reasonable, the ignorance or mistake 
must have been based on information, or lack of it, that would indicate to a 
reasonable person that the other person consented.  Additionally, the ignorance or 
mistake cannot be based on the negligent failure to discover the true facts.  
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Negligence is the absence of due care.  Due care is what a reasonably careful 
person would do under the same or similar circumstances.  The accused’s state of 
intoxication, if any, at the time of the offense is not relevant to mistake of fact.  A 
mistaken belief that the other person consented must be that which a reasonably 
careful, ordinary, prudent, sober adult would have had under the circumstances at 
the time of the offense.  A reasonable mistake of fact may not be found that is 
based upon ambiguous conduct by an alleged victim that is the product of conduct 
by the accused that amounts to force, violence, duress, menace, or fear of 
immediate and unlawful bodily injury on the person of the alleged victim or 
another.” 
SEC. 5. CONFORMING COURTS-MARTIAL WITH U.S. DISTRICT COURT 
PROCEDURES  
(a) APPLY THE SAME TEST THAT IS USED IN U.S. DISTRICT COURT FOR 
INSTRUCTIONS ON LESSER-INCLUDED OFFENSES IN COURTS-MARTIAL BY 
ADDING SECTION 850(C)(5) OF TITLE 10 U.S. CODE—Section 850(c)(5), is added 
stating: 
“(c) An instruction on a lesser-included offense may not be made to the 
members by the military judge unless (1) a proper request is made; (2) the lesser-
offense elements are identical to part of the greater-offense elements; (3) some 
evidence would justify conviction of the lesser offense; (4) there is evidence such 
that the jury may find the defendant innocent of the greater and guilty of the lesser-
included offense; and (5) mutuality.” 
SEC. 6.  INADMISSIBILITY OF GOOD MILITARY CHARACTER EVIDENCE  
(a) ADMISSIBILITY OF GOOD MILITARY CHARACTER EVIDENCE IN CASES 
INVOLVING VIOLENCE OR SEXUAL ASSAULT.  Section 850b is added to Title 10 
U.S. Code as follows: 
“§ 850b. art. 50b. Admissibility of character evidence 
     In any case, not capital, involving a violation of Articles 118 to 132; 
Articles 77 to 82 involving predicate offenses under Articles 118 to 132; and 
Articles 133 and 134 offenses involving violence or sexual activity, evidence of 
military character is not admissible to show probability of innocence.  Affidavits or 
other written statements of persons other than the accused, concerning the 
character of the accused or of any other witness, and evidence of law-abiding 
character shall be admissible to the same extent as under Federal Rule of Evidence 
405 in criminal cases tried in U.S. District Court.  
     General military character includes but is not limited to past or future 
combat performance, dependability, leadership, initiative, duty performance, 
proficiency, military bearing, and promptness.  Evidence of law-abiding character 
shall be admissible to the same extent as under Federal Rule of Evidence 404 in 
criminal cases tried in U.S. District Court.”    
 
 
 
 
